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Abstract 
Despite its apparent intuitiveness and widespread interest from across various fields, ‘effort’ is a variable that seems difficult 
to define. The purpose of this article is to consider and define ‘effort’ during task performance. In doing so I argue for a 
distinction between the actual effort (objective effort) required, and the perception of that effort (subjective effort), during 
intentional performance of tasks. I adopt a set theoretical approach to defining both actual effort and the perception of effort 
as both constructs and concepts. Further, I aim to present discussion and definitions that are agnostic of the specific task 
demands being performed (i.e. physical, cognitive, self-control, or a combination of task demands). Throughout, I attempt to 
draw upon and synthesise thoughts and ideas from across a multitude of disciplines (though note that this is not intended to be 
an exhaustive interdisciplinary review), engage in considerable armchair philosophising, and also offer what small insights I 
have from my own experience both as someone experiencing ‘effort’, and as a third-person observer investigating it. This work 
is intended to, at the very least, make my own current conceptualisation and understanding of ‘effort’ transparent to other 
researchers, and aid in the interpretation of any subsequent empirical work on the topic. Further, I hope that it might be of use 
to researchers from the various fields interested in this topic, and assist in fostering opportunities for integration of learnings 
across disciplines. It is my intention for this work to support further understanding of the role of ‘effort’ and its perception from 
a broad scientific perspective. 
 
Introduction 
 
“There is no greater impediment to the advancement 
of knowledge than the ambiguity of words” 
(Thomas Reid, 1852. Essays on the Intellectual Pow-
ers of Man) 
 
Effort, that eponymous term of task perfor-
mance (physical, cognitive1, and self-control; Preston 
and Wegner, 2009; Massin, 2017), is a variable that 
seems difficult to define despite being seemingly intu-
itive to many. Its distinct phenomenology appears eas-
ily recognisable; the fact that we seem capable of per-
ceiving when we ourselves are employing it, and iden-
tifying it when others do the same. Given everyone’s 
somewhat tacit understanding, in addition to its history 
(briefly reviewed below), you might be forgiven for 
thinking that there is consensus at least on the character 
of the variable (Richter and Wright, 2014; Massin, 
2017). The origin of the term apparently comes from 
the old French portmanteau of the Latin ‘ex-’ meaning 
‘out’, and ‘fortis’ meaning ‘strong’; esforcier (or esfort,  
 
1 Note, I use the term ‘cognitive’ in lieu of the term ‘mental’. As 
noted by Bruya & Tang (2018), most researchers agree upon the 
general reductionist desideratum that cognition has its origin in 
physiological processes in the nervous system and that the term 
‘mental’ may be misconstrued as supporting a dualist conception of 
the body and mind. 
 
esforz). However, the Oxford2 (“A vigorous or deter-
mined attempt”) and Cambridge3 (“physical or mental 
activity needed to achieve something”) English diction-
aries definitions of effort are somewhat vague, at least 
from a scientific perspective. Indeed, most scientific 
disciplines with interest in understanding it seem at a 
loss for an adequate definition. 
Effort has been a source of interest to scientists 
and philosophers for some time. Indeed, wu wei (Chi-
nese: 無爲; pinyin: wú wéi), literally meaning “in the 
absence of/without doing exertion” or “effortless ac-
tion”, was a concept that emerged from Confucianism 
and became an important aspect of Daoism (Slinger-
land, 2003): “Act without action; work without effort” 
(Laozi, Dao De Jing, Chapter 63, cited in Lee et al., 
2009). In Ancient Greece the spirit Horme (Ancient 
Greek: Ὁρμή, pronounced Ormí) personified energetic 
activity, impulse or effort (to do a thing), and an altar 
was held to her in Athens (Pausanias, 1918). The con-
cept of willed effort was central to much of the work of 
early French philosopher Maine de Biran (1805). An- 
2 https://www.lexico.com/definition/effort [accessed 2nd June 
2020] 
3 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/effort [ac-
cessed 2nd June 2020]  
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Figure 1. Usage of the words ‘effort’ and ‘exertion’ as a percentage of all books in the Google NGram corpus (https://books.google.com/ngrams) 
 
other, Henri Bergson revived many concepts of Bira-
nian philosophy and psychology, in combination with 
aspects of Hellenistic thought; Hercules, the hero-god 
of the ancient Cynics and Stoics (Kotva, 2016). Indeed, 
there was a religiosity and mysticism in this such that 
Bergson thought “…effort is of God, if not God [H]im-
self” [my insertion4] (Kotva, 2016). Around the end of 
the 19th century a considerable body of work was con-
ducted regarding the notion of effort in both physical 
and cognitive tasks. Bastian (1887) coined the term 
‘kinaesthesia’ which encompassed not only the sense 
of movement, position, and muscle force or tension, but 
also the ‘sense of effort’. Though, there was considera-
ble debate (which continues to this day) regarding 
where the sensory signals came from for the feeling or 
perception of effort (i.e. it’s phenomenology); some ar-
gued for its central origin (e.g. Bain, 1855; Helmholtz, 
1866; Müller, 1842, Wundt, 1902), while others sup-
ported a peripheral source (Bastian, 1896; James, 1880, 
1890). Around a similar time, the French philosopher 
Guilluame Ferrero discussed the role of effort in regu-
lating human behaviour (Ferrero, 1894) and John 
Dewey (1897) wrote on the psychology of effort. Both 
Ach (1910; 1935) and Hillgruber (1912) in the early 
20th century considered the role of the ‘will’ to over-
come performance barriers. Effort as a variable in-
volved in work was discussed in the 1940s by Hull 
(1943) and reviewed two decades later by Lewis 
(1965). Further, in the 1950s, von Holst and Mit-
tlestaedt (1950), and Sperry (1950), both independently 
proposed (in agreement with earlier thought), that sig-
nals relating to motor commands (efference copies)  
 
4 The misuse of lower case ‘h’ in referring to God in the original 
quote was pointed out to me by one of my PhD students, Emily 
Budzynski-Seymour, for which I am thankful.  
 
helped clarify whether sensory signals received from 
motor action where a result of volition or from external 
environmental forces (i.e. did I move my arm, or did 
someone else?). In 1973 Daniel Kahneman published 
his influential book Attention and Effort claiming that 
the two were in essence synonymous. Later, Brehm and 
Self (1989) formally described what is known as Moti-
vational Intensity Theory; in brief, this suggested that 
how much effort someone is willing to put into achiev-
ing a given task is dependent upon what is termed their 
‘potential motivation’.  Regarding measurement, de-
velopment of the first psychophysical scales for the 
perception of effort5, relating to the perception of 
‘heaviness’ of activity, occurred in the 1950s (Stevens, 
1957). However, at least in relation to physical tasks, 
nowadays people are mostly familiar with the scales 
developed by Gunnar Borg from the 1960s onwards 
(Borg, 1998). It has been thought for some time that 
effort is inherently aversive; the “Principle of Least Ef-
fort” (Zipf, 1949). Yet others have discussed effort as 
being something of inherent value (Massin, 2017; Ma-
haraj, 2017). A more balanced perspective argues that 
effort can be costly or valued dependent upon individ-
ual and contextual factors (Inzlicht et al., 2018). 
General interest in effort, based upon usage of 
the term in books analysed using Google Ngram over 
the past ~200 years has increased (figure 1). Scientific 
interest in effort of all kinds (effort and the related term 
‘exertion’, both physical and cognitive task efforts, and 
both objective/actual and subjective/perceived efforts) 
appeared to be most intense across the 19th century (fig-
ure 2).  
5 They actually referred to perceived ‘exertion’ similarly to Borg 
– see later for a discussion of perceptions of ‘effort’ vs ‘exertion’, 
in addition to their distinction from ‘heaviness’ 
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Figure 2. Number of articles using the words (top) ‘effort’ and ‘exertion’, (middle) ‘physical AND effort’ and ‘(cognitive OR mental) AND effort’, and 
(bottom) ‘(objective OR actual) AND effort’ and ‘(subjective OR perceived OR perception of) AND effort’ as a proportion of all articles in Europe PMC 
(using the “europepmc” package - https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/europepmc/europepmc.pdf) 
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After the Second World War there was a decline in 
productivity, as with many other fields. However, in the 
past two decades there has been a resurgence and 
growth of interest. In recent years, effort has been stud-
ied across many fields including: philosophy, cognitive 
and social psychology, neuroscience, clinical symptom 
testing, economics, ergonomics, project management, 
translation and editing, speech, language and hearing, 
robotics and artificial intelligence, and kinesiology 
(e.g. Rosenbaum & Gregory, 2002; Parfitt and Hughes, 
2009; Smirnaul et al., 2013; Pageaux, 2014; Fisher and 
Steele, 2014; Bigler et al., 2014; de Morree and Mar-
cora, 2015; Abbiss et al., 2015; Shepherd, 2016; Cha et 
al., 2015; Shadmehr et al., 2016; Pageaux, 2016; Steele 
et al., 2017; Cos et al., 2017; Morel et al., 2017; Shenav 
et al., 2017; Massin, 2017; Picou et al., 2017; St Clair 
Gibson et al., 2018; Inzlicht et al., 2018; Charness et 
al., 2018; Scarton et al., 2019; Andre et al., 2019; Steele 
et al., 2019; Halperin et al., 2020). Across these disci-
plines there are similar interests in the role that effort 
plays, despite the varied tasks to which the idea is ap-
plied, for example: which factors determine selection 
and initiation of behaviour? What determines behav-
ioural persistence in task performance attempts? What 
are the underlying mechanisms involved in carrying out 
task performances? How do people adapt to the contin-
ued performance of task behaviours? Etc. Further, 
much of the work in these areas necessarily intertwines 
with other cognate concepts including ‘trying’, 
‘forces’, ‘resistance’, ‘demands’, ‘work’, ‘difficulty’ 
etc. I note here to begin that it is not my intention to try 
and ‘explain’ effort in these regards. Instead, my focus 
is only upon definition, and the value that presents in 
helping diverse fields further knowledge on ‘effort’. 
Considering the diverse interest in the concept 
of ‘effort’ it has been noted that, though many specific 
‘species’ of efforts have sometimes been defined (that 
is to say, within specific fields and in certain applica-
tions or tasks), there are few if any explicit ‘general’ 
definitions6 of the term that could be applied across 
 
6 I confess a specifically frustrating example of lack of explicit 
definition comes in the early work of William James (1880) in The 
Feeling of Effort. In it he continually refers to “effort properly so 
called” without any such conceptual or operational definition of the 
term. 
7 Yes, that is intended to be a pun… be prepared for injections of 
‘silliness’ in this article including robots, zombies, comic books, 
wizards, videogame cheats etc. 
8 Of the sort I engage in throughout this article, albeit interleaved 
with reference to empirical work including my own. 
9 Though, see later a ‘tongue in cheek’ example wherein we might 
imagine a planet that could ‘experience’ effort, and may even have 
a perception of its efforts. 
fields (Massin, 2017).  I am in agreement with others 
(Massin, 2017; Bruya and Tang, 2018), who have ar-
gued that the lack of such a definition impedes interdis-
ciplinary collaboration and the integration of findings 
from across fields; and further, has the potential to pro-
mote misunderstanding.  
Massin (2017) recently took up the effort7 of 
producing a general definition for ‘effort’. The specif-
ics of his definition and arguments will be touched 
upon throughout this article where I find myself both in 
agreement and disagreement in places; I note though 
that his work is admirable and certainly the first to my 
knowledge that has attempted such a challenging task. 
Initially, he notes that some may object to the determi-
nation of a definition prior to empirical investigation; 
though he makes a case for the role of armchair philos-
ophising8 in determining a definition for effort. Some 
truths about it are clear. For example, he notes several 
things which to him seem plainly self-evident regarding 
effort: 
• “Effort is not a planet”9 
• “Efforts are not feelings”10 
• “Efforts are actions”11 
• “Efforts can fail or succeed” 
• “Efforts are always exerted against some re-
sistance” 
• “Efforts are always made to reach some goal”12 
• “The intensity of efforts is not a function of 
their failure/success”13 
 
He also makes a case for the provision of a def-
inition prior to empirical investigation noting there are 
concerns with attempting to do the converse (that is em-
pirically investigate before defining what it is we want 
to investigate): 
• The practical impossibility of investigation: 
How are we to look for something we have no 
idea about?14 
10 As will become clear, I agree with this in the sense that effort 
is an objectively definable phenomenon which we can, but may not 
always, have a feeling or perception of.  
11 On this I also agree, but caveat that this does not imply they 
need a conscious actor. 
12 Similarly, to footnote 10 this ‘goal’ does not have to be a goal 
in the sense of that sought by a conscious actor. Just that they are 
directed at, or toward something. 
13 Though it also seems reasonable that in ‘most’ tasks the inten-
sity of effort likely modulates the probability of failure/success 
14 He notes “Meno’s paradox” in this regard (Plato, Meno, 80d, in 
Cooper, 1997: 880) 
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• The theoretical impossibility of mistake: What-
ever is found can be claimed to be exactly what 
we were looking for. 
• The epistemic impossibility of disagreement: If 
it cannot be characterized independently of 
varied empirical investigations, no two expla-
nations could ever conflict as no two would be 
about the same explanandum. 
 
Indeed, without an a priori agreed upon defini-
tion of ‘effort’ it will remain a possibility that research-
ers from different fields, and even within the same 
field, use the term to refer to distinctly different phe-
nomena (Haslam, 2016; Massin, 2017; Knudson, 2019; 
Fiske, 2020). Using the Tower of Babel and consider-
ing Forscher’s (1963) parable “Chaos in the Brick-
yard”, Knudson (2019) notes that in kinesiology lack of 
consistent nomenclature likely results in researchers 
erecting their own sub disciplinary ‘walls’ or piles of 
unconnected ‘bricks’. These have little connection to 
other walls in the tower of the fields knowledge. One 
might extend the metaphor further to say that they also 
lack ‘bridges’ between the towers to enable other fields 
to cooperate with one another in an interdisciplinary 
fashion.  
Particularly for fields that seek to create ab-
stractions to explain reality, common language is a pre-
requisite for clear communication (Starosta and Petryn-
ski, 2007). Indeed, this is a problem for fields like psy-
chology and other social sciences that deal with malle-
able concepts; what Hacking (1995) calls ‘human 
kinds’ as opposed to the ‘natural kinds’ of the ‘harder’ 
sciences. Such concepts can ‘creep’ in their definitions 
(Haslam, 2016).  
In an attempt to leverage an agreed upon defi-
nition it might make sense to begin with the dictionary 
definitions of the term. Though, as noted, at least those 
in English appear to be vague in their description. Fur-
ther, as Fiske (2020) notes in his discussion of the ‘lex-
ical fallacy’ in emotion research:  
“… it is not uncommon for psychologists to 
begin an article by quoting a dictionary definition, as 
if an entry in a dictionary or vernacular language con-
sisted of a psychologically, socially, or culturally valid 
 
15 As Fiske (2020) notes in reference to their work on kama muta 
“Of course, our stipulation may turn out not to delineate a natural 
kind, but we hope that explicating the construct as clearly as possi-
ble will enable us to find out – and thereby incrementally delineate 
more valid approximations…” 
construct that extends beyond linguistic usage… lexi-
cographers merely record how people use words; they 
make no claims about what’s in the real world beyond 
language.” 
 
I contend most of the fields interested in effort 
are not interested in the word usage, but instead in un-
derstanding ‘effort’ itself. Indeed, though I am reluctant 
to a priori presume I will be successful in doing so, I 
am interested, as I believe many others are, in under-
standing whether or not a concept of ‘effort’ can be pro-
duced that describes some a ‘natural kind’15. Thus, 
though I will refer to others terminology and definitions 
throughout this article, I aim to try and avoid the ‘lexi-
cal hang-ups’ that come with reifying existing word us-
age merely because it is common. Indeed, Fiske (2020) 
further points out the ‘linguistic chauvinism’ of assum-
ing that “English, alone among languages, fortuitously 
captures a scientifically valid taxomony… Does the 
English lexicon get [effort] right, cutting nature at its 
joints, whereas 7000 other languages fail to do so?” 
[my insertion]. Many languages have words that might 
be translated to ‘effort’ which may or may not have pol-
ysemy, and may or may not have colloquial synonyms: 
for example, ‘exertion’16. Science is a cross-language 
and cross-cultural endeavour and the language it uses 
to communicate must not fall prey to lexical fallacies 
irrespective of their linguistic origins. In this sense, one 
could be so bold as to begin by suggesting that we drop 
the term ‘effort’ entirely choosing a new term that is 
not marred with historical lexical baggage. Fiske 
(2020) termed the emotion of his groups research focus 
kama muta using the dead Sanskrit language to avoid 
the issues of using an existing vernacular lexeme. For 
my endeavour, it could be as simple as using a typo-
graphical symbol instead to denote the variables (e.g. 
E, Ɛ, ɸ, or μ etc.) which maybe more felicitous. Or sim-
ilarly to Fiske (2020) we could also use a dead language 
translation of ‘effort’ (Latin – Conatum; Old English – 
Anginn; Sanskrit - īhita|), or adopt the term Horme17 in 
recognition of the Ancient Greek spirit. Though I am 
inclined towards this idea due my belief that clear def-
inition of the ‘concept’ and ‘construct’ is of greater im-
portance than the label we give to it (Markus, 2008; 
16 An example of the issues caused specifically in kinesiology re-
garding recent debates upon perceptions of ‘effort’ or perceptions 
of ‘exertion’ is noted as a later section. 
17 Though the pronunciation is ‘Ormí’, in modern Greek the word 
means ‘momentum’. Thus to avoid confusion we might instead 
adopt the word as written in English, Horme, and pronounced with 
a hard /h/ - as in /ˈhɔːmi/ 
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Slingerland, 2003; Fiske, 2020)18, there are some prac-
tical concerns in following it through (Fiske, 2020). 
Adopting a novel term potentially limits communica-
tion with those who already use the existing terminol-
ogy, and it is a tall demand to expect researchers across 
fields to begin to utilise this new term. Thus, though I 
am partial to adopting the term Horme, I will for the 
sake of ease of communication continue to use the term 
‘effort’ in this article; but, I stress that the definition, 
and not the label, is the more important component. 
Unsurprisingly, despite varied folk notions and 
both colloquial and scientific uses of the term, few have 
explicitly clarified whether they considered effort as be-
ing a fundamentally objective or subjective phenom-
ena: that is, distinguished between actual effort and 
perception of that effort. Implicitly at least, in many 
cases effort is typically (though not always) considered 
as one or the other. Certainly within many fields, effort 
is often considered as an ordinal variable whereby ex-
perimental conditions manipulate the degree of effort 
required to actually achieve a task without specifically 
quantifying the intensity of that effort (i.e. high effort, 
or low effort) nor the perception of it. Yet, it is my ex-
perience19 that many people upon hearing the term ‘ef-
fort’20 immediately assume that a feeling or perception 
is being referred to.  
However, I will argue here that the actual ef-
fort required (objective effort), and the perception of 
that effort (subjective effort), are two related yet dis-
tinct variables both of which have been inconsistently 
defined, manipulated, and measured across the fields 
which study them. This is an issue as without appropri-
ate operational definitions which are agreed upon and 
accepted by these fields, a scientific understanding of 
either, and indeed their relation, will remain out of 
reach.  
The overarching aim then of this piece is to 
consider and define ‘effort’ during task performance in 
an attempt to bring clarity to the topic and permit uni-
fication of the variable across different fields of in-
quiry. I will draw distinction between the actual effort 
required (objective effort), and the perception of that 
effort (subjective effort), and propose appropriate 
means of defining, and therefore considerations for ma-
nipulating and measuring, both. I will focus my defini-
tions following a set theoretical approach for both ac-
 
18 Partly due to the influence of Slingerland’s (2003) discussion 
of wu wei as a conceptual metaphor. We could call what I intend to 
define ‘blue elephants’ for all I really care. The definition itself is 
the more important factor. 
19 Largely within field of kinesiology and closely related fields. 
tual and perceived effort as both constructs and con-
cepts (Markus, 2008); wherein the former refers to a 
population-dependent definition of the variable and the 
latter a population-independent definition of the varia-
ble. It should be noted in advance that it is not the in-
tention of this article to provide an exhaustive interdis-
ciplinary review of effort. Though I have attempted to 
draw from as wide a range of fields as possible, it may 
appear that work from kinesiology is overrepresented; 
yet, this is to be expected given my background in the 
field. However, it is from a position of dissatisfaction 
with how my alma mater has handled the variable, 
finding existing definitions to be lacking, that I came to 
expand the breadth of my enquiry. In doing so I like to 
think that I have identified where there may be oppor-
tunities for integration of learnings across disciplines. 
As such, I aim to present discussion and definitions that 
are agnostic of the specific task demands being per-
formed (i.e. physical, cognitive, self-control, or a com-
bination of task demands e.g. dual tasks or net task de-
mands21) and which I hope will allow for further under-
standing of the role of effort and its perception from a 
broad scientific perspective. At the very least, doing do 
will provide others with a transparent overview of my 
own assumptions and aid in the interpretation of my 
own subsequent empirical work. Indeed, as Massin 
(2017): 
 
“…looking for a definition of effort consists in trying to 
make explicit our pretheoretical understanding of ef-
fort; we make a lot of assumptions about efforts in or-
dinary life and in sciences. By unearthing them, one 
may hope to arrive at a clear understanding of the na-
ture of efforts.” 
 
Why separate actual effort (objective) and the 
perception of that effort (subjective)? 
 
“Centuries and centuries of idealism have not failed 
to influence reality”  
(Jorge Luis Borges, 1940.  Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Ter-
tius) 
 
In the short story, Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, 
Borges describes an imaginary world named Tlön 
wherein the people hold an extreme form of George 
Berkeley’s subjective idealism or ‘immaterialism’. 
20 In addition to other cognate terms, in particular ‘fatigue’ 
21 It could be argued that dichotomising physical/cognitive tasks, 
even if merely for simplicity of communication, is inaccurate as any 
volitional physical task for example will have some cognitive com-
ponent. It may merely be better to just consider net task demands. 
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This philosophy in essence denies the existence of mat-
ter, with everything existing only as ideas in the minds 
of perceivers. As such, things cannot exist unless they 
are perceived. Within the history of research regarding 
effort there have been many who hold a view, at least 
of effort, that is in keeping with idealism. In Borges 
story, the idealism of the inhabitants of Tlön begins to 
affect reality itself with ideas begetting the production 
of duplication of objects called hrönir. I interpreted this 
story as somewhat allegorical regarding the state of 
thought, at least from some thinkers, regarding ‘effort’. 
Many early thinkers on the topic explicitly endorsed the 
view that effort was no more than a feeling. Massin 
(2017) notes that Maine de Biran explicitly endorsed 
this view, and that many of those involved in the early 
debates regarding centralism versus peripheralism 
spoke regarding effort and the feeling of effort as freely 
interchangeable; at the least giving the impression that 
effort is just a feeling22. More recent thinkers have 
noted regarding effort: “If a person feels loaded and 
effortful, he is loaded and effortful…” (Johanssen, 
1979, pp 105); “… there is no objective counterpart to 
this perceptual phenomenon…” (Gamberale, 1990); 
“Effort by definition is an inference or perception” 
(Kuppuswamy, 2017); and some seem unclear as to 
whether they consider it23 as an objective or subjective 
phenomenon (Hockey et al., 2011). 
However, though such thinking has been influ-
ential, and indeed I have experienced much of it, not all 
historical, nor contemporary thinkers hold the view that 
effort is just a feeling or perception. John Dewey 
(1897) was at least one early thinker to explicitly dif-
ferentiate between what he referred to as the ‘fact’ of 
effort, and the ‘sense’ of effort. Indeed, he noted that 
“Practically stated, this means that effort is nothing 
more, and also nothing less than the tension between 
means and ends in action, and that the sense of effort is 
the awareness of this conflict.”  Some have focused pri-
marily on ‘effort’ as an objective phenomenon. For ex-
ample, Kahneman’s (1973) conceptualisation of effort 
was objective, though he and others acknowledged the 
accompanying subjective experience (Mulder, 1986; 
Bruya and Tang, 2018). Others clearly differentiate the 
actual effort and the perception of it (Preston and 
Wegner, 2009). In philosophy of action, Shepherd 
 
22 Massin (2017) himself seems to favour a realist view of ‘effort’ 
being that he opts for a ‘force-based’ account of it, whilst noting his 
arguments for force realism (Massin, 2009) in opposition to Carte-
sian and Humean traditions 
23 And indeed other cognate concepts such as ‘fatigue’. 
24 Though notably I do not expect anyone to also necessarily hold 
these intuitions. 
(2016) differentiates between the ‘experience of trying’ 
and ‘actual trying’, and Lafargue and Franck (2009) 
note that “… one has to consider that an action is al-
ways carried out with a certain amount of effort…”. 
Massin (2017) notes “Pace the primitive-feeling view 
of effort, the “of” in the “feeling of effort” must be the 
representational “of” after all: Feelings of effort are 
feeling-acts directed at efforts as their objects.” In dis-
cussing methods for the study of effort in economics 
experiments, Charness et al. (2018) note the need to dif-
fer between “stated effort and real effort”. In project 
management, though more often applying to antici-
pated effort, there is acknowledgement of the need to 
differentiate between that and the actual effort required 
(Höst and Wohlin, 1997; Jørgensen, 2004). Most re-
cently, André et al., (2019) in their integrative model of 
effortful control, clearly differentiate between effort ac-
tually required to perform tasks, and the accompanying 
feeling of effort.  
Intuitively, at least to me24, the separation of 
the objective and subjective dimensions of ‘effort’ con-
ceptually seems simple. Effort in an objective sense 
might best be thought of as that which is actually done 
in attempting to perform a task. Massin (2017) argues 
that efforts are not veridical, but here the feeling or per-
ception of that effort can be considered as the phenom-
enology accompanying the ‘attempting’ or ‘trying’ and 
thus as a likely related, but distinct, veridical phenom-
ena25. The actual effort (objective effort) done in at-
tempt to meet a set of task demands might track closely 
with our perception of that effort (subjective effort). 
However, though under most normal circumstances 
this may be the case, and indeed in populations where 
this is so we would be justified in treating them as being 
the same construct (Markus, 2008), their conceptual 
distinction seems intuitive and indeed there may be in-
stances where the two are incongruent thus represent-
ing an actual effort – perception of effort illusion of 
sorts.   
Perceptual illusions have been defined as “…a 
discrepancy between one’s perceptions of an object or 
event observed under different conditions…” (Reyn-
olds, 1988). Even when you explain illusions, you often 
still fall prey to them. Considering the strong effects of 
25 Shepherd (2016) goes so far so to say that from a neural basis 
the ‘experience of trying’ and ‘actual trying’ is more than veridical 
in that they are one and the same i.e. experience is causal. Though 
he notes that it is clearly possible to have actual trying without the 
experience of it and thus it is sufficient, but not necessary.  
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such visual illusions as the Ebbinhaus’ Tichtener cir-
cles, Müller-Lyer lines, and the Necker cube, in addi-
tion to exteroceptive illusions regarding our own bod-
ies such as the rubber hand illusion, it should perhaps 
be uncontroversial to propose that our perceptions of 
the effort done in attempt to perform a task (the 
‘event’26) may not match the actual effort done in that 
attempt and may be influenced by other factors (‘con-
ditions’). Given that functionally speaking a ‘sense or-
gan’ is intended to provide some representation of how 
the world is, it seems reasonable to suggest that intero-
ception such as the perception of effort also operates in 
such a way (Serban, nd.). It could be considered that 
interoception, as compared to exteroception is unique 
in that it is not clear what the reality is we are saying it 
is intending to represent and thus how can it be said to 
misrepresent it.27 Can something ‘feel’ effortful but not 
‘be’ effortful, or vice versa? If we accept the intuition 
that actual effort is involved in trying to perform tasks, 
then I think it is plainly obvious that we can experience 
interoceptive illusions regarding effort. In fact, the 
world is rife with examples that illustrate this. 
Examples of the incongruence between repre-
sentation, the perception of effort28, and of what can be 
said to be objectively happening given that the task is 
being attempted, the actual effort, are wide. As noted 
earlier, the Daoist concept of wu wei clearly differenti-
ates the phenomenology from what is actually happen-
ing29. Indeed, within the system of conceptual meta-
phors presented by Slingerland (2003), an actor (per-
son) is commonly considered in two ways; as subject 
and as self, where ‘subject’ is the locus of conscious-
ness and subjective experience, and the ‘self’ is consid-
ered as an object (the body, a location, faculty etc). Un-
der this the use of objective to refer to the actual effort 
the ‘self’ does in any task attempt, and the subjective to 
refer to the experience of that effort by the ‘subject’ be-
come clear. Slingerland (2003) clarifies:  
“It is important to realize, however, that wu-
wei properly refers not to what is actually happening 
(or not happening) in the realm of observable action 
but rather to the state of mind of the actor. That is, it 
refers not to what is or is not being done but to the phe-
nomenological state of the doer.” 
 
 
26 Or event(s) given continued or repeated performance of a task 
and considering each instantaneous moment in time as an ‘event’. 
27 For example, it seems easy to catch the intuition that something 
can ‘look’ red, but may not actually ‘be’ red. However, it is difficult 
to catch the same intuition about interoceptive senses… can some-
thing that ‘feels’ itchy not ‘be’ itchy? 
Emblematic of this are so called flow states; 
clear cases of objective effort being required and in-
deed being put forth (as evidenced by performance of 
the task at a high level of performance), and yet is ac-
companied by a negligible perception of effort (e.g. 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Csikszentmihalyi et al., 2005). 
Hypnotic states are another example where people are 
induced to perform tasks, which arguably require effort 
to perform, and yet they experience them as ‘effortless’ 
(Ruehle and Zamansky, 1997). Indeed, hypnosis can be 
used to induce a decrease or increase in perception of 
effort during exercise tasks, despite the actual task de-
mands remaining the same (Williamson et al., 2001). 
Reviews of the literature report on studies that have 
shown attentional focus, the use of music, imagery, the 
presence of different olfactory and visual stimuli, con-
ditions of virtual reality, and the presence of an audi-
ence, can all alter the reported perception of effort even 
when actual task demands for physical tasks are the 
same and presumably no change in the actual capacity 
to meet them has occured (Razon et al., 2012; 
Hutchinson and Tenenbaum, 2019). Manipulation of 
auditory feedback regarding heart rate has similarly 
been shown to affect perception of effort despite simi-
lar actual task demands and no impact on heart rate it-
self, and referred to as an ‘interoceptive illusion’ 
(Iodice et al., 2019). 
There are also many examples, where relative 
to maximum capacity, there are discrepancies between 
the actual effort required based upon the task demands 
and the perceptions of effort experienced. For example, 
in studies of force matching tasks people tend to under-
estimate their effort at low forces, and overestimate it 
at high forces (Taylor, 2009). Even with application of 
calibration methods, though accuracy is improved, peo-
ple still find they are inaccurate in their perception of 
effort in application of force (Spielholz, 2006). With 
continued performance of physical tasks, though the 
perception of effort is often directionally associated 
with the actual effort required, there is not necessarily 
a one to one agreement between the two (Steele et al., 
2019; Emanuel et al., 2020). In ergonomics and work, 
directional associations between actual task demands 
have also been shown for a range of tasks, despite 
28 Or at the very least, the ‘self-report’ behaviour indicating it – 
see brief discussion of methods of third person phenomenological 
inquiry in a later section. 
29 Though of interest, in modern practice (at least in Chinese bank 
managers) the application of this concept has been found to be more 
akin to finding the path of least resistance and thus perhaps seeking 
out ways to perform tasks such that they require objectively less 
effort (Xing and Sims, 2012). 
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agreement again not necessarily being present (Fleish-
man et al., 1984). Indeed, in physical tasks people are 
able to apply greater efforts with the ordinal increase in 
actual demands, but are still poor at estimating the 
amount of effort actually required (Richter, 2015; 
Armes et al., 2020). Though, this lack of congruence is 
not always present; across different muscle actions and 
tasks people are sometimes able to match relative force 
based upon perception of effort (Taylor, 2016). Similar 
results have been reported for different physical task 
modalities matched to oxygen costs relative to peak 
(Shepard et al., 1992). The perception of effort in phys-
ical tasks thus seems at least to be directionally accu-
rate, albeit a very coarse representation of the actual ef-
fort required most of the time. 
An extreme case of the incongruence between 
actual effort and perception of effort is in the case of 
schizophrenia. For both physical (Lafargue and Franck, 
2009) and cognitive tasks (Gerrans, 2015), schizophre-
nia is associated with a lack of the sense of agency or 
ownership of their performance, which is thought to be 
due to a malfunctioning of the sensory apparatus and 
processing of sensory stimuli to generate the perception 
of effort. Yet, even in normal healthy persons, tasks 
performances that are both unconscious and uninten-
tional still require actual effort as evidenced by capac-
ity limitations (Weingarten et al., 2016; Melnikoff and 
Bargh, 2018).  
Review of studies in project management for 
software development highlight that findings regarding 
the congruency of expert estimations of effort are 
mixed; some showing good agreement, and others poor 
(Jørgensen, 2004). For consumer responses to loyalty 
programmes, perception of effort can be manipulated 
by use of different reference efforts (e.g. what is re-
quired of other individuals) such that, despite the same 
actual demands, peoples perception of effort to meet 
programme requirements can be higher or lower (Ki-
vetz and Simonson, 2003). Similarly, to the noted 
coarse-grained representation of effort in physical 
tasks, the same seems to be the case in economics; the 
directional relationships of actual effort and perception 
of effort is often similar, though the degree of congru-
ency between the two is less clear (Charness et al., 
2018). This has also been found for post-editing (Moor-
kens et al., 2015; Scarton et al., 2019) and listening 
tasks (Moore and Picou, 2018; Picou et al., 2017). In 
 
30 Of course, such incongruence may merely result from lack of 
reliability in either operationalisation of the objective or subjective 
components, similar to the typical lack of correlation between self-
report and behavioural measures (Dang et al., 2020). 
performance of math tasks, despite similar actual de-
mands the degree of interest can also impact the per-
ception of effort (Song et al., 2019). Indeed, Dunn et al. 
(2016) argue that the perception of effort is a meta-cog-
nitive process involved in the evaluation of task de-
mands (actual effort) and that it is possible manipulate 
this perceptual and inferential process, even when ob-
jective demands remain similar.  
The intention of this section was simple; 
merely to provide examples to convince readers of the 
need to differentiate the “actual -” and the “perception 
of -” with respect to “effort”. Given the myriad exam-
ples of a lack of congruence (at least a lack of fine-
grained accuracy30), and that we know people’s intro-
spections regarding cognitive processes are sometimes 
imperfect and often entirely mistaken (Nisbett and Wil-
son, 1977) it seems difficult to argue otherwise. Indeed, 
Dewey (1897) went so far as to note “In some cases it 
seems almost as if the relation between effort as objec-
tive fact, and effort a psychical fact, were an inverse 
one.” In this regard we might consider extensions of 
Wittgensteinian thought on perception to include effort 
(Davies, 2011; Campbell and O’Sullivan, 2015; Block, 
2007). Could we imagine a person who, much like a 
blind person has no visual perception, has no conscious 
perception of the effort required to perform tasks? Most 
people don’t think that because the blind person cannot 
see this means light and spatial qualities of objects do 
not exist; so why would we treat the example of a per-
son who cannot perceive effort any differently? Surely, 
they still require actual effort to attempt performance 
of tasks. 31 Is there the possibility of aspect perception, 
similar to the famous duck-rabbit illusion, whereby ob-
jectively equal task performances are perceived in dif-
ferent ways? Or the potential for something similar to 
the idea of spectrum inversion (i.e. red things look 
green) such that objectively difficult tasks are per-
ceived as ‘easy’ and vice versa? 
 Though clearly, the perception of effort is un-
likely to be merely just for the representation of some 
objective thing called effort (Preston and Wegner, 
2009), this seems likely to be a major function. As 
noted, debate regarding the neural underpinnings of 
sensory stimuli for the perception of effort date back 
some time; though today there is wider agreement on 
key elements of some sort of efferent-afferent compar-
ator model (Lafargue and Franck, 2009; Gerrans, 2015;  
31 This strays into the realm of philosophical zombies… and as 
zombies can be scary (and the cause for much consternation 
amongst philosophers) we’ll leave it here for now. 
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Seghezzi et al., 2019). Nevertheless, it is not my inten-
tion to review this here. The intention is to merely high-
light that, in order to understand such cases when ob-
jective and subjective constructs and concepts do and 
do not relate to one another, and the implications of this 
in development of theories regarding effort, it is neces-
sary to define separately both the objective, and subjec-
tive, constructs of effort. 
 
 
 
 
Actual (objective) effort 
To begin with I offer an analogy which I feel 
provides an intuitively simple solution to the definition 
of objective effort. Within materials mechanics, effort 
is a variable often referred to denoting the stress that a 
material experiences as a result of the application of 
force. Indeed, some dictionaries offer such a technical 
definition for the term ‘effort’ (“A force exerted by a 
Table 1. Examples of existing definitions of actual (objective) effort. 
Source Definitions 
Dewey (1897) “Practically stated, this means that effort is nothing more, and also nothing less, 
than tension between means and ends in action…” 
 
Globerson (1983) “For a given task demand (which is within the capacity limits of the tested chil-
dren), there should be a negative correlation between the subject’s developmental 
Ms capacity (structural capacity limit) and mental effort exertion. That is, a child 
with a larger Ms capacity should exert less mental effort for the same task de-
mand than a child with a smaller Ms capacity.” 
 
Salomon (1984) “The number of non-automatic elaborations applied to a unit of material to be 
learned.” 
 
Mulder (1986) “… the active involvement of subjects in the performance of mental tasks.” 
 
Backs and Seljos (1994) “Mental effort is a term used to describe the amount of information processing 
resources that are allocated during task performance…” 
 
Jansma et al., (2007) “We defined effort as the allocation of resources when performing a task…” 
 
Shenhav et al., (2017) “… what mediates between (a) the characteristics of a target task and the sub-
ject’s available information-processing capacity and (b) the fidelity of the infor-
mation-processing operations actually performed, as reflected in task perfor-
mance. The first two factors, task characteristics and capacity, determine what 
level of performance is attainable in principle.” 
 
Massin (2017) “.. a motor effort consists of (i) and agent exercising a mechanical force (F1) on a 
body in order to make it move or stay at rest and (ii) that mechanical force being 
at least partly counterbalance by an opposite force (F2): the resistive force…” 
 
Inzlicht et al., (2018) “Effort refers to… the process that mediates between how well an organism can 
potentially perform on some task and how well they actually perform… [and] is a 
volitional, intentional process, something that organisms apply, and as such, it 
corresponds to what organisms are actively doing and not what is passively hap-
pening to them.” 
“Effort is distinguishable from demand [original authors emphasis] or difficulty: 
effort corresponds to the intensity of mental or physical work that organisms ap-
ply towards some outcome, whereas demand of difficulty refers to a property of 
the ask itself (e.g. holding seven items vs three items in working memory) …” 
 
Steele et al., (2019) “The intensity of effort during exercise can be defined in relation to the current 
ability to meet the demands of the task being attempted…” 
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machine or in a process”)32; though of course we 
should be cautious in laying too much credence on this 
as noted (Fiske, 2020). Similarly, it is often considered 
relatively with respect to the strength, or maximal ca-
pacity, of the material to withstand the imposed force 
and thus stress. In this field, effort can be objectively 
defined in terms of the absolute demands imposed upon 
the material (i.e. Pascals) and often a factor of safety is 
considered and determined by the maximal strength rel-
ative to the absolute demands. The latter could, how-
ever, also be expressed such that the absolute demands 
are expressed relative to the maximal strength and thus 
reflect the relative demands imposed. Such a seemingly 
simple approach whereby the effort experienced can be 
objectively defined as the relative demands presents 
useful applications for fields interested in intentional 
task performance.  
Massin (2017) also mentions this example: that 
effort and force are often used equivalently in mechan-
ics. He differentiates between what he refers to as ‘re-
source/capacity’33 based accounts and ‘force’ based ac-
counts of effort. Though he notes that these accounts of 
effort could be considered extensionally equivalent, he 
dislikes the option of a ‘mixed’ approach that permits 
the encompassing of both34. Instead he appears to opt 
for a purely absolute force-based account35. However, 
I believe it is possible to combine the two in a simple 
account of effort as being the demands of a task relative 
 
32 https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/effort [accessed 2nd 
June 2020]. 
33 Though, as Massin (2017) notes, these differ with respect to 
whether they consider ‘capacity’ as being some non-depletable (e.g. 
Kahneman, 1973; Kurzban et al., 2013) or depletable (Gendolla and 
Wright, 2009) resource, as well as whether they specify what the 
resource is: Physiological e.g. glucose (Gailiot and Baumeister, 
2007) or ‘toxic neural waste accumulation’ (Holroyd, 2016); func-
tional e.g. computational capacity (Kahneman, 1973; Kurzban et 
al., 2013); ‘ego’ (Baumeister et al., 2000); or some ‘non-committal 
conceptual resource (“Although agents engaging in effortful behav-
iour can fruitfully be described as if they were allocating some lim-
ited resource, this does not entail that there is any finite resource 
really allocated by the agent.”) 
34 It is worth noting though that he has more recently noted to me 
in correspondence, based upon feedback from reading an early draft 
of this manuscript, that the two accounts should be combined, yet 
professes to be unsure exactly how best to do so. 
35 Though he discusses the relativity of subjective efforts. 
36 Though in his conception ‘moral’ capacity was not sufficient 
per se and required effort to be added:  
“The facts may be most briefly symbolized thus, S standing for the 
sensual motive, M for the moral and E for the effort: 
M per se < S 
M + E > S 
In other words, if E adds itself to M, S immediately offers the least 
resistance, and motion occurs in spite of it.” 
to the capacity to meet those demands. In doing so it is 
possible to retain Massin’s (2017) suggestion that effort 
is conceptualised as a vector quality with magnitude 
and direction. Indeed, we can allow for that magnitude 
to vary not only as a function of changing task demands 
and that they provide resistance to trying to perform a 
task, but also if we consider that the capacity need not 
necessarily be fixed and can differ at any given instant.  
Actual effort has sometimes been conceptual-
ised in a manner similar to this, albeit not always ex-
plicitly. William James (1880) considered ‘moral’ ef-
fort in action wherein the ‘moral motives’ might be lik-
ened to a capacity of sorts and effort utilised to over-
come ‘sensual motives’36. For effort in physical tasks 
many have considered this idea of task demands rela-
tive to capacity (e.g. Gamberale, 199037; Taylor, 2009; 
Xia and Frey Law, 2008; Taylor, 2016; Burnley and 
Jones, 2018; Potvin and Fuglevand, 2017; Steele et al., 
2019)38. For cognitive tasks and self-control there are 
several models that are explicit in the consideration of 
some aspect of ‘capacity’ or ‘resource’ and, though not 
all conceptualise effort as being determined by task de-
mands relative to capacity, some do (e.g. Pascal-Leone, 
1970; Kahneman, 1973; Globerson, 1983; Mulder, 
1986; Longo and Barrett, 2010; Kruglanski et al., 2012; 
Kurzban et al., 2013; Peng et al., 2018; Andre et al., 
2019)39. Indeed, both task demands and capacity (or 
‘ability’) have been considered in discussion of the role 
37 Despite Gamberale (1990) noting just prior that “…there is no 
objective counterpart to this perceptual phenomenon…” he subse-
quently states “… it also reflects real conditions such as the inter-
play between the requirements of the physical task and the capacity 
of the individual.” 
38 Indeed, Xia and Frew Law (2008) are explicit in their concep-
tion of how ‘brain effort’ given to drive motor tasks is a function of 
the task demands and capacity:  
“Residual capacity (RC) is introduced to describe the remaining 
muscle strength capability due to fatigue, where 0% indicates no 
strength reserve (not physiological) and 100% indicates full non-
fatigued strength (Eq. (3)). This time-varying term can be used as a 
multiplier to decay maximum strength capabilities. Additionally, 
the central drive necessary to perform a task is modelled as brain 
effort (BE, Eqs. (4)), which may be used as a simple estimate of 
perceived exertion: 
 RC(t) = MA + MR = 100% - MF (3) 
 
 If TL ≤ RC, BE = 
𝑇𝐿
𝑅𝐶
 x 100% 
 If TL > RC, BE = 100%  (4)” 
39 Kruglanski et al (2012) are also quite clear that effort (effective 
driving force) equals the demands (resistive force) but cannot ex-
ceed capacity (potential driving force):  
“Postulate 3: The magnitude of the effective driving force MDE 
will be equal to magnitude MR of the restraining force and lower or 
(at most) equal to magnitude MDP of the potential driving force: 
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of effort in causal ascription of behaviours (Weiner et 
al., 1972) and in desert (Sher, 1979). A non-exhaustive 
selection of examples of definitions of actual effort 
from the literature is presented in table 1. 
An important distinction between the effort ex-
perienced by non-conscious objects such as in materials 
mechanics, and conscious organisms intentionally at-
tempting performance of tasks, has also been noted by 
many40: that it involves intent by an organism i.e. an 
agentic self. However, I contend that, at least for actual 
effort, there is no need for a conscious actor to be pre-
sent. That is to say actual effort is something that can 
be ‘experienced’ by both conscious and non-conscious 
things. There merely has to be the directional ‘intent’ 
of an action towards a goal (i.e. attempted task perfor-
mance). 
I wish to offer an explicit definition which, 
similarly to in materials mechanics, permits this dis-
tinction between absolute task demands and effort (and 
between actual, and perception of, effort), but holds 
that absolute task demands relative to current capacity 
to meet those demands (i.e. relative task demands) are 
in essence what determine actual effort. As such, when 
absolute demands increase such that they represent a 
greater relative demand, or when a reduction in capac-
ity is present, there similarly is an increase in relative 
task demands and thus the objective effort required also 
increases.  
 
A definition of ‘actual’ effort 
 Considering the above distinction, I offer the 
following definition: 
 
 Effort; noun 
That which must be done to achieve a particu-
lar task demand, or set of task demands, and 
which is determined by the current task de-
 
 MR = MDE < MDP  (3) 
Derivation 3 (from Postulate 3): The greater the demands of a 
task to be employed as means to goal attainment, the greater the 
individuals energy expenditures within limits of his or her potential 
driving force.” 
40 Indeed, folk concepts of intentionality see ‘effort’ as being a 
‘symptom’ of intent (Malle and Knobe, 1996)  
41 Note here that effort, which can be determined a priori, is dis-
tinguished from any resultant behaviour itself (i.e. the task perfor-
mance). Even if it weren’t attempted, a task would still require effort 
to perform, and this would be ‘experienced’ if that attempt (try) 
were made. 
42 Some models of objective effort have included two ‘types’ of 
effort. For example, Mulder’s (1986) model considers 1) attention 
mands relative to capacity to meet those de-
mands, though cannot exceed that current ca-
pacity. 
 
This definition is clear in how it presents effort 
as a variable that relates the absolute task demands to 
the current capacity to meet those task demands thus in 
essence equating actual effort to the relative task de-
mands i.e. they are logically interchangeable. Though 
this definition can in theory be used to determine the 
actual effort required for a given task a priori, effort by 
its nature teleological in that no effort is ‘experienced’ 
unless there is ‘intent’ to complete a task41.  The defi-
nition can be applied to both physical and cognitive42 
tasks (that is to say it is agnostic of the specific nature 
of the task43) and is in essence anchored with a ceiling 
relating to the point at which, assuming genuine inten-
tional attempts to meet them, it is no longer possible to 
meet the task demands.  
In considering the set theoretical approach sug-
gested by Markus (2008) regarding the definition of 
variables, we might define actual effort as a construct 
(that is to say a population-dependent variable) as fol-
lows:  
 
Effort (construct) 
EA(i, t, CA, DA) is the actual effort for any indi-
vidual i at time t where CA(i, t, xC), and DA(i, t, 
xD) are the actual capacity and actual demands 
respectively, and xC and xD are the magnitudes 
of those respectively for individual i at time t.  
 
In essence, any given individual at any given 
time only has one effort level (which is comprised of 
their capacity and the task demands), but more than one 
person can share the same effort level. Markus (2008) 
notes that “… the definition of a construct necessitates 
the stipulation of an origin, however arbitrary to iden-
tify the scale of the construct. It then becomes possible 
demanding controlled information processing, and 2) a person’s re-
quirement to change their current energy resource state towards that 
which is optimal for the task. However, in the context of effort 
within a capacity model (i.e. that as a relative variable it can only 
be allocated up to and not exceeding 100%), these two ‘types’ might 
instead be considered as separate task demands that both require 
effort to achieve. 
43 Indeed, in Massin’s (2017) definition of a ‘force’ based account 
he argues that this, along with ‘goal-directedness’ and ‘resistance’, 
are key ingredients of efforts. But he extends ‘force’ to include 
physical and cognitive forces. Thus, to my interpretation, he ap-
pears to be using all of these terms in a non-committal agnostic 
manner. A number of others also imply that effort is a universal 
applied to various task performances (Dietrich, 2003; Dietrich and 
Sparling, 2004; Franconeri et al., 2013; Preston and Wegner, 2009). 
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to give a construct a formal definition.” This definition 
is, by its nature, a ratio given that capacity and demands 
have natural origins: capacity can be zero, as can de-
mands. In fact, it could be expressed as a percentage: 
 
𝐷𝐴 ≤ 𝐶𝐴 → 𝐸𝐴 =  (
𝐷𝐴
𝐶𝐴
)  𝑥 100% 
𝐷𝐴 > 𝐶𝐴 → 𝐸𝐴 =  100% 
Equation 1. 
The construct of actual effort (EA) defined 
above is referred to as being population-dependent in 
that the set describing it includes only combinations of 
all individuals, times, capacities and demands that exist 
empirically. However, we can conceptually extend this 
to be a set of hypothetically infinite size that describes 
all possible efforts; it could be expressed from 0 to 
100% to any degree of precision imagined. Conceptu-
ally then we can denote the set as:  EA`(i, t, CA, DA, w), 
where the ` denotes a new variable and w denotes all 
possible states of affairs i.e. combinations of i, t, CA, 
and DA. Together, these construct and concept sets not 
only include the variables as they extend over given 
populations, but also to projections of all possible pop-
ulations. Further, we could add a term to our conceptual 
set such that it is intensional to all possible types of 
tasks (e.g. tAny). As such, the capacity is always defined 
in relation to the nature of the task being attempted. In 
a way this deals with the issue faced by many resource 
or capacity based models of effort in determining what 
the ‘resources’ or ‘costs’ of effort are44. The task de-
mands may be a combination of physical, cognitive, or 
self-control based and thus we might consider the ‘net’ 
demands and the ‘net’ capacity to meet them. Either 
way, they are always specific to the given task, and ef-
fort is merely the ratio of specific task demands to the 
capacity to meet those specific demands45. 
For example, in a physical task the role of dif-
ferential demands and capacity are considered in that 
actual effort is determined by the task demands relative 
to the current capacity to meet task demands. As such, 
if two individuals were attempting to pick up the same 
specific absolute load (e.g. 80 kg) the stronger of the 
two would initially require less actual effort to com-
plete this task. If they had both performed prior tasks 
that had resulted in a reduction in their maximal 
strength, then each would require a greater actual effort 
to complete the task than compared with when their ca-
pacity was not reduced. And further, if both continued 
 
44 It is worth being explicit here; even though some use ‘re-
sources’ and ‘capacity’ differently, I am in essence treating them as 
synonyms. 
performing repetitions of this task their maximal 
strength might continue to reduce insidious to contin-
ued attempts to maintain a particular absolute demand, 
and thus require an increasingly greater actual effort 
with every individual or continued attempt to meet the 
task demands. Correspondingly, if the absolute task de-
mands where increased then both individuals would 
also require greater actual effort to complete the task. 
Yet for both the continued performance of the task with 
fixed absolute demands and insidious reduction of ca-
pacity, or the increase of absolute demands, task per-
formance would be capped by their maximum capacity 
at which maximum effort is required. With training 
though that maximum strength might be increased such 
that a given absolute task demand now represents rela-
tively less and so required less actual effort. Further, 
biomechanical alterations to the task might reduce the 
absolute demands and thus the actual effort. 
Similar examples could be provided for cogni-
tive tasks. For example, if two individuals were at-
tempting to hold a fixed number of items in their work-
ing memory, the one who has the larger working 
memory of the two would require less actual effort to 
complete this task. However, both individuals would 
again require greater actual effort to do so in the pres-
ence of lingering reduction in cognitive capacity from 
prior tasks, or from continued attempts to meet the task 
demands, or from increased absolute task demands (i.e. 
more items to be held in working memory). Again, 
training may also improve maximal capacity. Also, 
cognitive processing alterations (i.e. heuristics; Shah 
and Oppenheimer, 2008) might reduce task demands 
and thus the actual effort. 
Some have suggested that certain tasks might 
not be considered effortful even though they are diffi-
cult; at least when difficulty is considered as the prob-
ability of success. For example, Westbrook and Braver 
(2015) offer the example of trying to hit a bullseye. 
Massin (2017) rightly points out that, though efforts are 
accompanied by success/failure conditions, these do no 
determine the magnitude of those efforts. It is possible 
to subsume even this example into the current defini-
tion of actual effort. Arguably, one could try harder; 
that is to say employ more actual effort (concentrate 
more, apply greater control over fine motor action etc.) 
which might arguably strain the limit of their ability 
(capacity) to perform the task and thus make it require 
more actual effort. But, though such effort might in-
crease the probability of their success (or not), if they 
45 In fact, Skott (1997) has argued “The analysis [of effort] can 
proceed on the basis of any given cardinal representation of effort” 
even in the “absence of natural units”.  
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have a particularly low ability their probability of suc-
cess will still likely be low.  
Indeed, by way of demonstrating its task ag-
nostic nature further, it could even be applied to tasks 
performed in imaginary worlds as permitted by our 
conceptual definition. For example, McCoy and 
Ullman (2019) recently considered people’s judge-
ments of the effort that might be required for wizards 
casting spells in a world where spells required an 
amount of ‘magic points’ to be cast. Each spell was 
judged to require a specific absolute number of magic 
points with some spells being judged as requiring less 
effort than others. But, it could also be said that people 
would likely judge more powerful magic users (for ex-
ample an arch-mage) with greater capacity for magic 
points, to require less effort to perform any given spell 
compared to a weaker magic user (for example a neo-
phyte) with lesser capacity for magic points (Ullman, 
2019 – personal communication). Returning to Mas-
sin’s (2017) suggestion that “Effort is not a planet”; 
though I agree, we could imagine a planet that ‘experi-
enced’ effort. In the Marvel Comics universe there is a 
character called (somewhat aptly given the present 
topic) Ego the Living Planet. He is incredibly powerful, 
albeit limited in his capacity. As such, his attempts to 
perform tasks (e.g. control and transform his atmos-
phere or surface, generate energy blasts etc.) must place 
demands on him that cannot exceed his capacity, but 
could be expressed relative to his capacity. Thus, we 
could imagine Ego as ‘experiencing’ actual effort46. 
 
46 Arguably as a conscious being we could also imagine him hav-
ing a corresponding perception of that effort, if he had the appro-
priate system to produce such a phenomenology.  
47 In a brief discussion of effort and fatigue (at least in reference 
to the limitations of ‘resource based accounts’), Massin (2017) sug-
gests that we should not prejudge a relationship between the two in 
any definition of effort. He offers an example of a being with an 
“infinite amount of energy at his disposal – a being who therefore 
never gets tired” and that such a being, while empirically impossi-
ble, should not be metaphysically impossible or precluded by a def-
inition of effort. But such a being is possible with my definition. 
Their actual effort for continued performance of any given task 
would remain constant with time as their capacity never reduced. 
We might liken them to a videogame character who has a ‘power 
bar’ representing their capacity to perform special actions and 
which depletes each time they use one. A cheat code might enable 
them to perform such actions without the power bar ever reducing. 
But low-level special actions are still relatively speaking low effort, 
and vice versa.  
48 Note that here I have explicitly chosen to use the term ‘fatigue’. 
In fact, at least with respect to actual fatigue I feel it is very appro-
priate given that the term is also used in materials mechanics and is 
thus similar to the analogy provided regarding effort 
(https://uk.comsol.com/multiphysics/material-fatigue [accessed 2nd 
June 2020]). I am aware of the contention regarding the definition 
and use of this term, and the adoption of terms such as ‘performance 
Massin also argues that “Spontaneous muscle contrac-
tions, such as cramps, or externally generated muscle 
contractions, do not count as efforts…”. Yet, I would 
disagree that, while such actions generate an accompa-
nying perception of effort (Pageaux et al., 2015) these 
do not require actual effort; the task is actually at-
tempted and performed by the stimulated muscle, and 
cannot be performed in a manner that exceed the capac-
ity of that which performs it.  
 Considering these examples, and if we grant an 
assumption of a proportional relationships between the 
derivative of capacity (𝑑𝐶𝐴
𝑑𝑡
) and effort at the preceding 
time (𝐸𝐴𝑡−1), we could graphically depict the relation-
ships between task demands and effort at a given time 
(t), as well as the change in capacity and thus effort 
across given static absolute task demands over time47. 
Figure 3 shows: (A) the increased effort required with 
increased task demands (note the example assumes a 
capacity  of 100 AU); (B) the increase in effort with 
continued time attempting the task at those fixed abso-
lute demands; and (C) the drop in current capacity to 
meet those demands (i.e. ‘fatigue’48 which in essence 
could be considered merely the change in capacity of 
the opposite sign). Thus, relative task demands become 
progressively greater (hence the increased effort), due 
to the decrease in capacity, up to the point of momen-
tary task failure49. However, effort cannot exceed 100% 
and so, when attempting a task of demands equal to ca-
pacity (in this example an initially maximal demand  
 
fatigability’ to refer to this objective drop in capacity, whereas ‘per-
ceived fatigability’ is used to refer to the sensory and phenomeno-
logical state associated with it (Kluger et al., 2013; Enoka and 
Duchateau, 2016). Personally, I find the inclusion of the suffix “-
ability” to add confusion as, at least to me; it implies the ‘suscepti-
bility’ to the original noun to which it was attached. Thus, I interpret 
the term (at least independent of any explicit definition) to refer to 
tendency for an individual’s capacity to reduce either in terms of 
magnitude, or magnitude over time (i.e. rate). Indeed, some have 
considered this interpretation (Hunter, 2018). Nevertheless, I will 
sometimes opt to use the term actual ‘fatigue’ (and the accompany-
ing perception of fatigue with the same considerations for the need 
to separate them as with the separation of actual and perceived ef-
fort) and argue that it should just be preceded by ‘magnitude’ or 
‘rate’ if that is what is being referred to. When I use the term how-
ever, I am merely alluding to a reduction in the capacity to meet a 
given task demand, or set of demands, and will more often than not 
use that language explicitly.  
49 Note that there is a need to differentiate between ‘fatigue’ and 
‘failure’ which, at least in kinesiology, is not often done (Enoka and 
Duchateau, 2008; Steele et al., 2017). Failure occurs at the point at 
which task demands exceed current capacity. Fatigue, conversely, 
is the reduction in the capacity to perform the task. Thus, while fa-
tigue maybe an ongoing process, failure is better considered and 
event. Further, reaching task failure does not mean that fatigue is 
maximal, nor even substantial.  
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Figure 3. The relationships between demands, capacity, time, and effort, given the definition proposed across varying fixed absolute task demand examples 
(10%-90% of initial capacity) and an initially maximal task. Panel (A) shows the relationship between demands and effort; Panel (B) shows the change in 
effort over time given continued attempt to perform a task of fixed absolute demands; Panel (C) shows the change in capacity over time given continued 
attempt to perform a task of fixed absolute demands (note, where absolute task demands remain fixed, the increase in effort results from the decrease in 
capacity over time); and Panel (D) shows these relationships four-dimensionally. Note, the derivatives of demands (
𝑑𝐷𝐴
𝑑𝑡
), capacity (
𝑑𝐶𝐴
𝑑𝑡
), and effort (
𝑑𝐸𝐴
𝑑𝑡
)with 
respect to time are as follows: (
𝑑𝐷𝐴
𝑑𝑡
) is a constant (=0); (
𝑑𝐶𝐴
𝑑𝑡
)  is −(𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝐴𝑡−1)/100 i.e. [0,-1] where k is maximum capacity; and (
𝑑𝐸𝐴
𝑑𝑡
) is 
𝑑𝐷𝐴∗ 𝐶𝐴−𝑑𝐶𝐴∗ 𝑑𝐷𝐴 
𝐶𝐴
2    
 
task), the decay in capacity becomes linear as it is pro-
portional to the effort required. Figure 3D shows the 
four-dimensional relationships between capacity, de-
mands, time, and effort. Considering the example of an 
initially maximal demand task, as capacity drops the 
demands that can be met also reduce; theoretically a 
maximal task could be continued until capacity is equal 
to zero. Similarly, we could consider a ‘supramaximal’ 
task (i.e. one with demands greater than capacity) could  
be attempted and would indeed result in a maximal ef-
fort; but the task demands would not be met and thus 
the task would not be performed 
I argue that this definition is useful particularly 
as it permits a starting point in reality for consideration 
of where our perception of such effort might diverge 
from that which can be objectively defined to have been 
actually done. It should be noted that, based upon this 
definition, without an individual actor performing an 
initially maximal task or continuing to the point of mo- 
 
 
50 Indeed, knowing this initial capacity (or capacity at any point 
in time), though less of a problem when considering simple physical 
tasks (e.g. maximum force production, maximum speed etc.), is per-
haps more of an issue as task complexity increases (even the sim-
plest physical task can often be broken down into numerous degrees 
 
mentary task failure (or indeed not putting forth any ef-
fort at all – a minimum or maximum) it is difficult, and 
perhaps impossible, to actually know during task per-
formance at any given point in time precisely what a 
person’s required actual effort is. Without the ability to 
continuously monitor during tasks the relationships be-
tween initial capacity50 to meet task demands, and the 
magnitude and rate of change in that capacity, we may 
never really know empirically what the actual effort re-
quired is in this relative sense. However, at present I 
see this is a technological limitation and, given the con-
ceptual definition offered, think that it is uncontrover-
sial to work within the model that actual effort is in es-
sence a latent variable that is determined by actual ca-
pacity and actual demands even if we can’t measure 
them directly yet.  
 I don’t think that the definition of actual effort 
in this manner is necessarily unique. As noted, many 
have at least alluded to the relationships between task 
demands, capacity, and effort. However, I feel that the 
of freedom) and even more so with the complexity of most cogni-
tive tasks and their processes. That being said, if we are good ma-
terialists, we can at least grant the assumption that even cognitive 
capacity has to be limited… but we could imagine something (a 
‘smart drug’ perhaps) that might enable that capacity to be in-
creased and thus the concept is still valid in such examples. 
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specific definition provided here could be said to be 
‘cleaner’ and I hope leaves less room for misinterpreta-
tion due to its explicit nature. The application of this 
definition might assist researchers in better manipulat-
ing the actual effort required during tasks to better un-
derstanding the role that effort as a construct plays in 
determining behaviours and responses across fields of  
inquiry. Indeed, effort is often considered as an ordinal 
variable and manipulated as such in experimental stud-
ies. However, understanding effort objectively as a 
continuous ratio variable might allow for a finer 
grained understanding of where, when, and why dis-
cordance exists between this and the subjective experi-
ence (perception) of that effort. Further, not only does 
a clear definition of actual effort permit greater ability 
to understand its role in behaviour and responses, it al-
lows consideration of the combined and differential in-
fluences that both actual effort, and the perception of 
it, impart.  
Having offered a definition, I now move away 
from the actual effort required and done for task per-
formance and to the phenomenology, the qualia, of that 
construct for conscious actors. However, before doing 
so it is necessary to highlight the distinction between 
sensation and perception as it could be said the former 
bridges the concepts of actual - and perception of - as 
we discuss them here. 
 
Sensation and perception 
 Many people when referring to ‘effort’ use ei-
ther ‘sensation of’ or ‘perception of’ seemingly under 
the assumption that these are terms that might be used 
interchangeably. I argue this is not the case and as such, 
prior to moving to discuss a definition of perception of 
effort it is necessary to highlight the difference between 
‘sensation’ and ‘perception’. Michel Cabanac, in his es-
say “What is sensation? Gnoti se auton” (Cabanac, 
1995), discussed the difference between these two con-
cepts referring to definitions from Levine and Shefner 
(1981) as follows: 
 
“[sensation is]... the process of detecting a 
stimulus (or some aspect of it) in the environ-
ment...” 
 
And, 
 
 
51 If you’re a fan of philosophical zombies feel free to swap out 
the robot for that instead. The point made remains the same. 
“[perception is]... the way in which we inter-
pret the information gathered (and processed) 
by the senses...”  
 
Summing this up they suggest that “In a word, 
we sense the presence of a stimulus, but we perceive 
what it is.” For reasons that will become clear in the 
following discussion and will hopefully convince the 
reader this is more than simply a semantic issue, I con-
sider the conscious experience of effort to be a percep-
tion that likely arises from a myriad of underpinning 
physiological sensations which in many cases relate to 
the actual effort required, though as I have noted may 
not always exist in congruence – that is to say, the sen-
sory stimuli resultant from some actual effort, may or 
may not result in a perceptual representation of that ef-
fort which is accurate.  
To illustrate the relationships between the var-
iables we are defining and discussing here – actual ef-
fort, sensations or the detection of effort being made, 
and perception of effort – I offer the analogy of an un-
conscious robot actor51 who can ‘experience’ the for-
mer two though cannot ‘interpret’ them, compared to a 
conscious human actor who experiences these in addi-
tion to conscious awareness of effort being exerted (fig-
ure 4). The unconscious robot may have a maximum 
capacity to perform a particular task, for example lift-
ing a weight or recalling from memory. The robot may 
also be programmed to attempt to perform this task. 
That is to say it intentionally does so (even though it is 
not conscious of this intent which is programmed). The 
actual effort required by the robot to perform the task 
is a function of the task demands relative to its capacity. 
Further, similarly to a conscious human, the robot can 
be programmed as such that its maximum capacity re-
duces as it continues to perform a task over time (i.e. it 
fatigues). As such, with time on task whereby the abso-
lute demands remain the same, the relative demands 
will increase and thus the actual effort required will in-
crease. We can consider this example with (e.g. the ro-
bot may have some sensors monitoring demands and 
changes to capacity resultant from fatigue, and thus 
have a composite signal generated for the relative de-
mands ‘experienced’ at any given point during task per-
formance i.e. actual effort) or without ever invoking 
any sensory apparatus to detect the stimulus that the in-
tentional task performance produces, and certainly  
PsyArχiv What is (perception of) effort? Objective and subjective effort during task performance Available at: 
31st August 2020 PREPRINT v.2.1 doi: 10.31234/osf.io/kbyhm 
 
 
Figure 4. The unconscious robot in this example, despite ‘experiencing’ the same actual effort as the conscious human, does not have a perceptual experi-
ence of the intentional performance of the task e.g. lifting the weight, or recalling from memory. Note, quotes are taken from Levine and Shefner (1981).  
 
without any perceptual apparatus that can interpret any 
sensory information generated. The robot ‘experiences’ 
the actual effort required irrespective of any degree of 
sensory or perceptual awareness. Contrastingly, the 
conscious human upon intentionally performing the 
task will generate sensory signals relating to this52, and 
this sensory information will be interpreted to generate 
a conscious experience i.e. perception. Considering 
this, although many use the phrase ‘sense of effort’, I  
will utilise ‘perception of effort’ in the interest of accu-
racy and now look to discuss and present an appropriate 
definition for the perception of effort. 
 
Perception of effort 
 Unlike actual effort which can be objectively 
defined independently of any conscious actor, the per-
ception of effort requires a conscious organism to ex-
perience “something it is like” to experience effort 
(Nagel, 1974). Therefore, though actual effort can be 
determined objectively, even a priori to intentional task 
performance, given we know the task demands and ca-
pacity of the actor, the perception of effort is unknown 
(though can of course be anticipated and predicted) un-
til it is experienced by a conscious organism. Some 
have argued that phenomenal experiences, including 
that of effort or even consciousness itself, do not re-
quire explanation; they are merely epiphenomenal to 
other biological activity (Kinsbourne, 1996; Pinker,  
 
52 As noted, there is historical and continuing debate regarding 
exactly what the sensory signals are.  
53 Indeed, Rorty (1977) notes this is no different than the parallel 
consideration of Mendel’s use of ‘gene’, and further notes that “…if 
 
1997). But, as Preston and Wegner (2009) have noted, 
there are functional benefits to this phenomenological 
experience of effort; feedback on task difficulty, 
prompting behaviour changes, indication of authorship 
of actions etc. Further, there is no need to understand 
the underlying biology that gives rise to such ‘epiphe-
nomena’ if we are content to be operationalist in this 
regard and any psychological constructs are instead 
thought of merely as placeholders for neurophysiolog-
ical mechanisms (Rorty, 1977)53. Though some re-
searchers are interested in uncovering these mecha-
nisms that ‘translate’ the objective reality of effort into 
its phenomenology, many researchers are interested in 
both objective and subjective effort without the need to 
know what’s going on in the ‘black box’. They wish to 
understand the functional relationships between the ob-
jective and the subjective, in addition to their independ-
ent and joint effects on behaviours, adaptations etc. So, 
it is not my intention here to discuss how actual effort 
during tasks gives rise to a perception of that effort; re-
sponsibilities such as this and discussion of how other 
conscious content arises can be left to others (Searle, 
1998; Morsella et al., 2016; Humphrey et al., 2020). In-
stead, again I merely intend to provide some definition 
of the variables such that we have a start and end point 
within a system that might not only assist those inter-
ested in examining that ‘black box’ of mechanisms, but 
the body had been easier to understand, nobody would have thought 
that we had a mind”.  
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that a definition of perception of effort might better as-
sist those interested in understanding that phenomenol-
ogy specifically.   
One issue we face with the consideration of the 
perception of effort is that, though we might be able to 
‘know’ that actual effort is occurring even as third per-
son observers, the precise phenomenology and magni-
tude to any third person observer remains unknown un-
til that experience is communicated behaviourally. 
Thus, we must have some approach to taking such ‘first 
person’ behavioural data, such as self-reports54 or other 
behavioural consequences, and from them interpreting 
from a third person perspective to draw inferences re-
garding phenomenology. Daniel Dennett (1991; 2003) 
has called such a method Heterophenomenology ("phe-
nomenology of another, not oneself") wherein “… ba-
sically, you have to take the vocal sounds emanating 
from the subjects’ mouths (and your own mouth) and 
interpret them!”. He states that “You are not authori-
tative about what is happening to you, but only about 
what seems to be happening in you, and we are giving 
you total, dictatorial authority over the account of how 
it seems to you, and what it is like to be you.” Dennett 
dislikes the use of ‘lone wolf autophenomenology’ 
where the subject and the experimenter are one and the 
same person. Others such as Max Velmans (2006) have 
proposed an approach called Critical Phenomenology 
which is reflexive, unlike Dennett’s approach, and he 
argues that even third person reports from experiment-
ers are ultimately based upon their first-person experi-
ences. Instead, he argues first- and third-person meth-
ods should be employed conjointly to provide triangu-
lation of evidence55; indeed, Velmans argues that ex-
perimenters do this frequently particularly in psychol-
ogy:  
 
“Do psychologists ever use first-person meth-
ods (in isolation, or in combination with third-person 
methods)? Of course we do. When setting up a labora-
tory experiment, say on perception, the very first thing 
one usually does is to try the experiment on oneself.” 
 
I must confess, I feel some affinity with this 
approach similarly to the affinity I feel with Massin’s 
 
54 Note, a ‘self-report’ need not be a verbal report, nor does it even 
need to be communicated in any specific lexicon. In fact, Dennett 
(1991) suggests we must grant that some aspects of ‘what it is like 
to be you’ may be ineffable: “What better grounds could we have 
for believing that you are unable to describe something than that 
(1) you don’t describe it, and (2) confess that you cannot? Of course 
you might be lying, but we’ll give you the benefit of the doubt.” 
(Dennett, 1991, pp 96-97) 
(2017) armchair philosophising; that is to say, in think-
ing through this topic I have done much of this self-
experimentation myself. Gualtiero Piccinini (2010) has 
attempted to improve upon Dennett’s method of Heter-
ophenomenology to incorporate the self-measurement 
of first-person data. He argues that scientists should in 
essence use the best evidence they have which might 
include first-person data, but that we should be cautious 
and reserved in what we can infer from it: 
 
“According to the self-measurement methodol-
ogy of first-person data, scientists treat subjects issuing 
first-person behaviours as a self-measuring instrument. 
It is the scientist’s responsibility to insure that the in-
strument is calibrated and set up properly and that the 
measurement is carried out correctly. It is also the sci-
entist’s responsibility to determine what can and can-
not be reliably measured by the instrument under the 
relevant circumstances. That being said, heterophe-
nomenology got two important points right: first-per-
son behaviours are not always a reliable window into 
the mind, and their use as evidence ought to be a form 
of third-person science.” 
 
As such, not only do we need to carefully con-
sider a definition of the perception of effort, but we 
need to consider the approach taken to measure this, 
and thus the ‘training’ involved in eliciting first-person 
data regarding it whether this is as a third-person ob-
server, or from self-measurement. These considera-
tions may be particularly important given that it is not 
immediately obvious whether perceptual phenomenol-
ogy is ‘thin’ or ‘thick’; that is to say either exhausted 
by low-level properties directly sensed, or whether it 
includes higher level properties such as potentials, 
causal relations, kinds, and functions (Masrour, 2011; 
Nanay, 2012). Considering the lack of consensus on the 
precise neurophysiological mechanisms that might 
give rise to a perception from sensory information that 
accompanies actual effort, it is difficult to say which of 
these, ‘thin’ or ‘thick’, effort might fall under. Yet, it 
has been argued that even conceptual experiences that 
are initially post-perceptual56, could become part of the 
perceptual experience (Nanay, 2012)57. Such, cognitive 
55 Arguably this suggests he is in favour of simple first-person 
experiments and the use of intuitions regarding perceptual phenom-
ena 
56 Recall that Dunn et al. (2016) have suggested effort is a meta-
cognitive evaluation. 
57 Nanay (2012) gives the example of a chess master who has 
spent such time training the conceptualisation of a particularly strat-
egy for an opening that it becomes automatic and part of their per-
ceptual experience of the board. 
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infiltration has implications relating to the instruction 
and training of subjects to elicit first-person data re-
garding their phenomenological experience. I, for ex-
ample, have spent many years thinking about this topic 
of effort and trying to attend very closely to the phe-
nomenological experience during tasks of all kinds; 
thus, it might not be surprising that it is now a quite 
salient part of my perceptual phenomenology.  
Though, even if such ‘cognitive infiltration’ is 
not something which happens and effort indeed falls 
within our perceptual experiences, our gestalt phenom-
enology is filled with many qualia at any given instant. 
Yet, given aspect perception, though they may fill our 
‘perceptual field’ we may experience each with differ-
ing degrees of salience (Davies, 2011)58. Thus, though 
some may have interest in understanding this gestalt 
whole, there must also be consideration of the separa-
tion of each quale within the phenomenological expe-
rience in order to obtain first-person data of the greatest 
‘precision’ and understand the composition of the 
whole59. 
Similar to other conscious personal experi-
ences such as taste, pleasure/pain, and wellbeing (Mos-
kowitz & Meiselman, 1977; Bartoshuk, 2014; Krueger 
& Stone, 2014), psychophysical approaches have been 
used in attempts to relate these subjective personal ex-
periences to objective physical processes (Borg, 1998). 
However, due to the fact that self-report or other behav-
iours are the data generated from this, it is not possible 
to completely ascertain the extent to which any meas-
ure of perception of effort obtained is truly reflective of 
the perceptual or conceptual processes underlying the 
experience of the actual effort required or done (Game-
berale, 1990). Because of this required step in the pro-
cess of measuring perception of effort (a subject 
providing a rating), careful consideration must be given 
to exactly how a definition of it is formed. The subject 
must understand what it is they are being asked to pro-
vide a rating of, or attend to, in order for that to be a 
valid reflection of the desired variable i.e. perception 
of effort (Moore et al., 2018; Halperin and Emanuel, 
2020). Further, considering additionally the nature of 
our definition of actual effort, and the relation of this 
to perception of that effort through sensory apparatus, 
it seems that any definition of the perception of effort 
(particularly because it must be provided to subjects or 
at least encapsulated in what a subject is asked to pro-
vide a rating of) should as closely as possible reflect 
 
58 In physical tasks the notion of whether perception of effort can 
be considered ‘gestalt’ has been specifically questioned 
(Hutchinson and Tenenbaum, 2006). 
this pathway and thus the subjective nature of the spe-
cific objective construct. Thus, in this section I will first 
discuss existing definitions of the perception of effort, 
in addition to some discussion of scales and instruc-
tions often used in intentional task performances both 
physical and cognitive, noting what I believe are some 
of the issues they produce. Then I will offer my defini-
tion of the perception of effort which I feel is an appro-
priate extension of the definition of actual effort. I will 
note here in advance that I think this definition of per-
ception of effort is inherently weaker that the one of-
fered for actual effort by dint of the fact that it is defin-
ing an aspect of phenomenology.  
 
Existing definitions of ‘perception’ of effort 
Various definitions for the perception of effort 
during both physical and cognitive tasks have been of-
fered from a range of authors and some of the most 
prominently used and cited have been included in Table 
2. While many offer value when it comes to the under-
standing and measurement of someone’s perception of 
effort, I feel that many suffer from shortcomings that 
might impact their use. Many of these issues are partic-
ularly evident from examination of the approaches used 
in combination with such definitions, to measure per-
ception of effort.  
As noted already there is the issue of some re-
ferring to a ‘sense of’ effort when it is perhaps more 
appropriate to refer a ‘perception of’ effort. Secondly, 
there is the issue of the terms ‘effort’ and ‘exertion’ be-
ing used interchangeably (as evident from some even 
using the terms in description of one another). In fact, 
sometimes these definitions are used to refer to effort 
and in others exertion, or even both within the same 
text. This presents issues particularly for those for 
whom English is not their first language and in an ex-
tension of the lexical fallacy arguments could create a 
case for dropping the terms in favour of a new label 
(e.g. Horme). There is also the issue of descriptions in-
cluding reference to things such as ‘heaviness’, ‘fa-
tigue’, ‘self-efficacy’, or things that could perhaps be 
grouped as ‘discomfort’ (i.e. ‘strain’). Indeed, many 
definitions appears to describe some gestalt experience. 
However, as noted, though humans experience multiple 
perceptions simultaneously during task performance, 
they are evidently capable of differentiating these as 
separate dimensions of their overall experience.  
 
59 Though, if the phenomenology of perception during task per-
formance is similar to that of visual perception, binocular rivalry 
might suggest that we cannot actually perceive this gestalt whole at 
any given instance. 
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Table 2. Existing definitions of perceived (subjective) effort 
Source Definitions 
Borg (1962) “the feeling of how heavy, strenuous and laborious exercise is” 
 
And, 
 
“the sensation from the organs of circulation and respiration, from 
the muscles, the skin, the joints and force” 
 
Gamberale (1990) “…the perception of effort should be interpreted as constituting a 
‘summing up’ of the influence on the organism from all structures un-
der stress during physical work.” 
 
Noble and Robertson (1996) “the subjective intensity of effort, strain, discomfort, and/or fatigue 
that is experienced during exercise” 
 
Burgess and Jones (1997) “Effort as an efferent perception may be defined as how hard one 
tried when carrying out a motor task.” 
 
Taylor (2009) “…the sense of effort gives a perception of the strength of muscle 
contraction relative to the total strength of the muscle.” 
 
And, 
 
“…a perception of the proportion of total muscle strength being 
used.” 
 
Preston and Wegner (2009) “The particular feeling of energy that is being exerted... accompanied 
by a sense of strain and labour, that intensifies the harder a person 
tries” 
 
Marcora (2010) “the conscious sensation of how hard, heavy, and strenuous a physi-
cal task is” 
 
Kirschner and Kirschner (2012) “…how hard a person tried to actively process presented infor-
mation… a combination of perceived demand characteristics, per-
ceived self-efficacy, and level/depth of information processing such 
that the first two influence the last which determines the amount of in-
vested mental effort” 
 
Dunn et al. (2016) “…conceptualizing effort is to liken it to a type of general metacogni-
tive evaluation of perceived task demand… In this vein, we can con-
sider an individual’s metacognitive evaluation of demand as akin to a 
type of metacognitive experience (e.g. perceived effort)” 
 
Taylor (2016) “…sense of effort, which reflects the relative strength of a muscle 
contraction as a proportion of that muscle’s maximum force out-
put…” 
 
Radel et al. (2017) “Mental effort is a feeling of strain occurring while investing a lim-
ited energetic resource to perform a mental task, due to the mobiliza-
tion of controlled cognitive processing.” 
 
Halperin and Emanuel (2020) “The process of investing a given amount of one’s perceived physical 
or mental resources out of the perceived maximum to perform a spe-
cific task” 
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Thus, here as mentioned I wish to focus my definition 
on the perception of ‘effort’ and how it is independent 
of other perceptions and will briefly highlight some of 
the issues caused by the conflations included in many 
existing definitions. 
 
Perception of ‘exertion’ or ‘effort’? 
 This problem of synonymy is one that is par-
ticularly evidenced in the field of kinesiology and in the 
study of physical task performance. In fact, this internal 
debate could be argued to be a major barrier in the ad-
vance of interdisciplinary work between kinesiology 
and other fields interested in effort. Abbiss et al. (2015) 
have argued that perception of ‘exertion’ and percep-
tion of ‘effort’ are not interchangeable terms, defining 
the former as “the amount of heaviness and strain ex-
perienced in physical work”, and the latter as “the 
amount of mental or physical energy being given to a 
task.” However, I believe an issue arises with insist-
ence on using both terms, despite offering differing def-
initions of them, when considering that in many lan-
guages the two translate as synonyms60. Table 4 pre-
sents translations of either term in 88 different lan-
guages highlighting where they do, and do not, trans-
late from English as synonyms in the target language.  
For example, though English is my first lan-
guage61, for many researchers with whom I have col-
laborated regarding effort in physical task performance 
it is not. These interactions have highlighted the issues 
of translation into their own languages. For example, in 
Portuguese both ‘exertion’ and ‘effort’ translate as 
‘esforço’. In French, both translate to ‘effort’. In Ital-
ian, both translate as ‘sforzo’. In German, both translate 
to a ‘anstrengung’; and further, I am informed, to add 
to the potential confusion, ‘schwer’ is a word often 
used interchangeably to refer to something requiring a 
high actual and/or perception of ‘effort’ or that is par-
ticularly ‘heavy’ – a problematic conflation that is ex-
plained further below. The use of the terms as syno-
nyms in some languages might create issues in attempt-
ing to measure either described variable, or indeed in 
the interpretation of the literature pertaining to either, 
 
60 A point that Abbiss et al. (2015) raise and then appear to 
promptly ignore. 
61 Once upon a time I spoke some remedial French and am cur-
rently learning Japanese 
62 He also suggests utilising the definition provided by Marcora 
(2010); though, both I and others (Halperin and Emanuel, 2020) 
find this definition to include unnecessarily misleading terms. 
63 Although, ‘pain’ has been reported as perceptually distinct from 
‘discomfort’ during exercise (Hamilton et al., 1996) and so the lat-
ter may be preferable for such exercise induced perceptions unless 
injury itself has occurred.  
when this involves those whose language treats the 
words as such. Pageaux (2016) has argued that, consid-
ering many within the literature do in fact use the two 
terms as synonyms already, and that many languages 
do the same, it may be best to instead use the terms in-
terchangeably62. Instead, the descriptors of other phe-
nomenological aspects associated with exercise (such 
as ‘strain’) might be better termed as ‘pain’ or ‘discom-
fort’63. Following from this disagreement within the lit-
erature my research group has also been suggested a 
combined approach to the terminology should be used 
(Steele et al., 2017b).  As ‘effort’ and ‘exertion’ are 
used by some interchangeably, but by others they are 
not, avoidance of such an approach might avoid confu-
sion in communication64. However, as most consider 
perception of ‘effort’ to refer in some way to the sub-
jective component relating to the attempt to meet the 
demands of a task (whether physical or cognitive), and 
that ‘exertion’ appears to be often used in reference to 
the perception of other aspects during those attempts, 
the term ‘effort’ might be more felicitous with respect 
to the former (but that ‘exertion’ not be used inter-
changeably with it), and ‘discomfort’ (or another con-
textually appropriate term e.g. ‘pain’, ‘fatigue’, 
‘force/load/weight/demand’) for the latter. This ap-
proach deals with the potential practical issues of sepa-
rating the two variables for measurement, and in such a 
way as to avoid issues in certain languages upon trans-
lation; and, would assist in avoiding unnecessary con-
fusion in interpretation of the literature around this 
area.   
 
Further problems with definitions, and measures, of 
perception of effort: Descriptors and anchors. 
 As noted above, many of the definitions of-
fered for perception of effort utilise other terms as de-
scriptors that could cause confusion for those being 
asked to offer an appraisal of this; and indeed, may be 
separate perceptions entirely. Further, many of these 
descriptors have been utilised in self-report tools (and 
their instructions) used to measure perception of ef-
fort65.  
64 Indeed, even for recent texts where the authors note this appar-
ent distinction between ‘effort’ and ‘exertion’ the terms are still 
used interchangeably without sufficient care as to when either is 
supposed to be appropriate (Hutchinson and Tenenbaum, 2019) 
65 I first became cognizant of many of these issues in the work on 
resistance training that my research group conducts (Steele, 2014; 
Steele et al., 2017b). 
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Table 3. Translations of ‘effort’ and ‘exertion’ across different languages.  
Language Ways to say effort Ways to say exertion Match O/X 
European Languages 
Albanian përpjekje tendosje X 
Basque ahalegin exertion* N/A 
Belarusian высілак напружанне X 
Bosnian napor napor O 
Bulgarian усилие усилие O 
Catalan esforç esforç O 
Croatian napor napor O 
Czech snaha námaha X 
Danish indsats anstrengelse X 
Dutch inspanning inspanning O 
Estonian pingutus pingutus O 
Finnish ponnistus ponnistus O 
French effort effort O 
Galician esforzo esforzo O 
German Anstrengung Anstrengung O 
Greek προσπάθεια (prospátheia) προσπάθεια (prospátheia) O 
Hungarian erőfeszítés erőfeszítés O 
Icelandic átak áreynslu X 
Irish iarracht exertion* N/A 
Italian sforzo sforzo O 
Latvian pūles piepūle X 
Lithuanian pastangos įsitempimas X 
Macedonian напор напор O 
Maltese isforz strapazz X 
Norwegian anstrengelse anstrengelse O 
Polish wysiłek wysiłek O 
Portuguese esforço esforço O 
Romanian efort efort O 
Russian усилие (usiliye) напряжение (napryazheniye) X 
Serbian напор (napor) напор (napor) O 
Slovak snaha námaha X 
Slovenian trud naporu X 
Spanish esfuerzo esfuerzo O 
Swedish ansträngning ansträngning O 
Ukrainian зусилля (zusyllya) напруга (napruha) X 
Welsh ymdrech ymdrech O 
Yiddish  ימ ןַאשרעזגי X 
Asian Languages 
Armenian ջանք լարում X 
Azerbaijani səy güc X 
Bengali প্রচেষ্টা উদ্যম X 
Chinese Simplified 功夫 (gōngfū) 用力 (yònglì) X 
Chinese Traditional 功夫 (gōngfū) 用力 (yònglì) X 
Georgian ძალისხმევა დაძაბვას X 
Gujarati પ્રયત્ન પ્રવૃત્તિ X 
Hindi प्रयास है तनाव X 
Hmong dag zog tom X 
Japanese 努力 努力 O 
Kannada ಪ್ರ ಯತ್ನ  ಪ್ರಿಶ್ರ ಮದಿಂದ X 
Kazakh күш салу жүктемесін X 
Khmer កិច្ចខិតខំប្រឹងប្ប្រង ខំប្រឹង X 
Korean 노력 (nolyeog) 노력 (nolyeog) O 
Lao ຄວາມພະຍາຍາມ ການອອກແຮງ X 
Malayalam ശ്രമം കഠാരി X 
Marathi प्रयत्न श्रम X 
Mongolian хүчин чармайлт хүчлээд X 
Myanmar (Burmese) 
က  ြိုးစ ြိုးအ ြိုးထတု်မှု ခေတတ ေဏ 
X 
Nepali प्रयास exertion X 
Sinhala උත්සාහයක් යයදීයෙන් X 
Tajik кӯшишҳои кушиши X 
Tamil முயற்சி உழைப்பு X 
Telugu ప్రయత్న ంతో కృషిచేసిన X 
Thai ความพยายาม การออกแรง X 
Turkish çaba çaba O 
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Table 3. Continued.  
Urdu  ششوک  مرشبت X 
Uzbek harakat qilish qizg'inlik X 
Vietnamese cố gắng Sự gắng sức X 
Middle-Eastern Languages 
Arabic دوهجم (majhud) دوهجم (majhud) O 
Hebrew  ץָמֲאַמ  ץָמֲאַמ O 
Persian  شلات روز لامعا X 
African Languages 
Afrikaans poging inspanning X 
Chichewa khama thukuta, X 
Hausa } o} arin exertion* N/A 
Igbo mgbalị exertion* N/A 
Sesotho boiteko bo Mokhathala X 
Somali dadaal dirqin X 
Swahili juhudi exertion* N/A 
Yoruba akitiyan ìṣákun X 
Zulu umzamo ukuzikhandla X 
Austronesian Languages 
Cebuano paningkamot paningkamot O 
Filipino pagsisikap pagpupunyagi X 
Indonesian upaya pengerahan tenaga X 
Javanese gaweyan kaluwehan X 
Malagasy ezaka ezak'izy X 
Malay usaha melakukan senaman X 
Maori kaha tautooraa X 
Other Languages 
Esperanto fortostreĉo penego X 
Haitian Creole efò efò O 
Latin conatus scientibus Lilybaei abstulisti X 
No. Matches (O) 29 
No. Differences (X) 54 
Percentage of Languages with Matches 34.94% 
Note: Translations were drawn from https://www.indifferentlanguages.com/   
Some languages most commonly adopt the English word as a 'loan word' and these are indicated by *  
‘Heavy’, ‘Heaviness’, or perception of absolute task 
demands 
 Use of the term ‘heavy’ is a particular issue for 
physical task performances which often involve actu-
ally lifting weights of different magnitudes. Many def-
initions used in fields studying these tasks, along with 
the tools used to elicit self-reports66 utilise descriptors 
that could be interpreted by someone as referencing 
perceptions of weight, or load, experienced67. Consid-
ering the definition of actual effort proposed, we can of 
course acknowledge that an increase in the weight used  
in a physical task will mean a greater effort is required 
and thus likely elicit a greater perception of effort. In 
fact, these scales have good construct validity when 
considered with reference to the weight/load used un-
surprisingly (Andersen et al., 2010; Buckley & Borg,  
 
66 For example, the Borg 6-20 Category Scale, Borg Category-
Ratio-10 Scale, OMNI scale etc. 
67 For example, Borg’s scale (1998) uses “Hard (heavy)”, “Weak 
(light)”, “Strong (heavy)” and the adult OMNI Scale, developed for 
use specifically with resistance training, adds to this by using spe-
cific images which depict an increasingly heavier load on the bar-
bell being held by the avatar (Robertson et al., 2003). 
 
 
2011; Colado et al., 2012; Hollander et al., 2015; Lins-
Filho et al., 2012; Pincivero, 2011; Gearhart et al., 
2001; Gearhart et al., 2002; Lagally et al., 2002a)68.  
However, as mentioned, the actual effort re-
quired to complete a task also rises over time, even 
when an absolute submaximal demand (e.g. 
weight/load/power/speed) is used, due to a reduction in 
the capacity to meet task demands (i.e. fatigue). Indeed, 
studies show that for physical tasks this also manifests 
in an increased perception of effort over time (Horts-
man et al., 1979; Noakes, 2004; Marcora & Staiano, 
2010; Buckley & Borg, 2011; Pincivero, & Gear, 2000; 
Pincivero et al., 2004; Testa et al, 2012). Indeed, this 
increasing perception of effort with continued time on 
68 And also, other physiological measures such as electromyo-
graphic amplitude, heart rate, and blood lactate when performing 
resistance training (Andersen et al., 2010; Hollander et al., 2015; 
Pincivero, 2011; Lagally et al., 2002b; Colado et al., 2012; Robert-
son et al., 2003). 
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task also occurs in cognitive tasks69 performed at fixed 
absolute demands due to the reduction in capacity (i.e. 
fatigue) that occurs (Wright et al., 2008; Hockey et al., 
2013; Richter et al., 2016; Bijleveld, 2018; Bambrah et 
al., 2019). As such, we would expect actual, and thus 
perception of, effort to differ independently of the sub-
maximal absolute demands of the task as a result of the 
reduction in capacity (fatigue) experienced during con-
tinued task performance70.  
Indeed, for example, a single instantaneous 
task attempt performed with say, 80% of a person’s 
maximum capacity, will require a greater actual effort, 
and likely produce a greater perception of effort, com-
pared to a single instantaneous task attempt performed 
at 50% of their maximum capacity. However, if the task 
attempt with 50% were repeated or continued to a point 
of momentary task failure (i.e. the point at which, de-
spite attempting to do so, a person can no longer meet 
the task demands71), we would expect a greater actual 
effort to be required, and thus likely a greater percep-
tion of effort, than that produced by the single task at-
tempt at 80%. The reduction of capacity that occurs 
with continued task attempts influences the actual ef-
fort required and thus should influence the perception 
of effort experienced. Yet if descriptors relating to the 
absolute task demands (e.g. weight/load in the case of 
a physical task) are used when attempting to measure 
perception of effort we may instead be asking persons 
to rate the perception of absolute demands being used 
in the task instead (i.e. its ‘heaviness’)72.  
 
‘Fatigue’, ‘Self-efficacy’, and perception of capacity to 
meet task demands 
As already noted, fatigue is a term often used 
for the reduction in capacity to meet task demands and 
 
69 Though, in certain cognitive tasks there can be a short-term re-
duction in perceived effort with time on task which is thought to be 
due to a ‘learning’ effect, and development and application of heu-
ristics to reduce processing demands (Shah and Oppenheimer, 
2008; Bambrah et al., 2019). 
70 Further reason to argue against the inclusion of descriptors re-
lating to the ‘heaviness’ of task demands when attempting to define 
perception of effort, at least for physical task performance, is that 
not only is the actual task demand (i.e. weight/load) independent of 
the actual and perceived effort, but also that the perceptions of ef-
fort, force, and heaviness are phenomenologically distinct and in-
deed neurophysiologically distinct mechanisms exist for the sen-
sory stimuli that the latter perceptions represent (Taylor, 2009; Tay-
lor, 2016; Proske and Allen, 2019). In fact, interesting work has 
shown this distinction using the size-weight illusion (Burgess and 
Jones, 1997; Buckingham et al., 2014). 
71 Note, I am aware here that, with respect to task performance by 
conscious actors such as humans, this ‘momentary task failure’ may 
which interacts with absolute task demands to deter-
mine the actual effort required. The perception of effort 
is directionally (albeit seemingly coarsely) related to 
this and, during continued task attempts at fixed abso-
lute demands, increases as a function of time due to the 
reduction in capacity that occurs (i.e. fatigue). Actual 
fatigue is merely capacity to meet task demands ex-
pressed with an opposite sign (i.e. a decrease in the ca-
pacity to meet task demands of a certain magnitude is 
the same as an increase in fatigue of a certain magni-
tude), and thus perception of fatigue is the perception 
of this changed capacity.  
However, a related variable is ‘self-efficacy’ 
which refers to an individual's belief in his or her ca-
pacity to execute behaviours necessary to meet specific 
task performance demands (Bandura, 1977; 1986; 
1997). Indeed, self-efficacy is essentially the percep-
tion of an individual’s capacity to meet task demands. 
Thus, ‘perception of fatigue’ and ‘self-efficacy’ are ex-
tensionally equivalent in that they both refer to the 
same variable: perception of capacity to meet task de-
mands73.  
During continued task performance the change 
in capacity to meet task demands and effort are related; 
but, upon task disengagement the actual effort, and also 
the perception of effort, experienced drop immediately 
to zero; whereas, the reduction in capacity to meet task 
demands, although often transient, may actually, and 
be perceived to, last past this point. Thus, though effort, 
both actual and the perception of, is influenced by the 
capacity to meet task demands, they are not the same 
thing. Indeed, the perception of capacity to meet task 
demands (whether termed ‘fatigue’ or ‘self-efficacy’) 
should be considered distinct from the perception of ef-
fort. 
or may not actually coincide with the intersection of actual task de-
mands and actual task capacity. Indeed, many argue that in such 
conscious actors it is more likely that task disengagement (i.e. the 
voluntary withdrawal of ‘trying’) occurs prior to this and instead 
when the actor reaches the level of perception of effort they are 
willing to put forth (which may or may not be maximal), or per-
ceives their capacity has reached its limit relative to the task de-
mands (Wright, 2008; Marcora and Staiano, 2010; Richter et al., 
2016). 
72 Hysteresis models are also of interest to consider here. For ex-
ample, in a stepwise or ramp task whereby absolute demands in-
crease up to a point, and then following this reverse (i.e. the absolute 
task demands decrease symmetrically), on the latter stage the per-
ception of effort is higher than during the former due to the residual 
drop in capacity that occurred (Montull et al., 2020). 
73 Wright et al. (2018) also appear to allude to this equivalency, 
albeit not explicitly.  
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Perception of fatigue is something that is often 
measured as a state variable in response to, or during, 
task performance and indeed is often related to percep-
tion of effort; that is to say the greater the perception of 
fatigue, the greater the perception of effort (Benoit et 
al., 2019; Mickelwright et al., 2017; Milyavskaya et al., 
2018; Greenhouse-Tucknott et al., 2019; Fernandez et 
al., 2020; Whitaker et al., 2019). Similarly, self-effi-
cacy74 has been examined and found to be related to 
perception of effort as a trait variable75 (i.e. typically 
the greater the self-efficacy, the lower the perceived ef-
fort; Kukla, 1972; Ford and Brehm, 1987; McAuley 
and Courneya, 1992; Rudolph and McAuley, 1996; 
Pender et al., 2002; Sarrazin et al., 2002; Yoshida et al., 
2002; Hu et al., 2007; Pinxten et al., 2014; Malik et al., 
2020); though has sometimes been measured as a state 
variable which reduces in response to continued task 
performance (Hall et al., 2005; Wrightson et al. 
2019)76, and has also been manipulated where studies 
have found increasing/decreasing self-efficacy de-
creased/increased perception of effort (and even voli-
tional performance) respectively (Weinberg et al., 
1979; 1980; 1981; Feltz and Riessinger, 1990; Fitzsim-
mons et al., 1991; Hockey, 1997; Kivetz and Simonson, 
2003; Muraven et al., 2006; Hutchinson et al., 2008; 
Cameron et al., 2019; Mlynski et al., 2020) . Indeed, 
further highlighting the extensional equivalence be-
tween these two constructs, several studies show that 
fatigue and self-efficacy are also associated; though in 
clinical populations and looking at ‘state’ measures 
(Findley et al., 1998; Akin and Guner, 2019). However, 
Stephan et al. (2016) have posed an ‘allostatic self-ef-
ficacy’ model whereby perception of fatigue77, particu-
larly chronic fatigue and depression, is viewed as a 
metacognitive phenomenon: “…a set of beliefs held by 
the brain about its own functional capacity…”.  
 
74 It is worth noting that there is considerable variation across 
studies in how ‘self-efficacy’ has been measured; some clearly ask 
regarding perceived capacity to meet task demands, others ask 
things such as perceived ability to tolerate the other perceptions ex-
perienced during task performance like discomfort. 
75 Perhaps more akin to initial ‘rested’ maximal capacity to meet 
task demands. 
76 Though notably, both Hall et al. (2005) and Wrightson et al. 
(2019) reported that the relationship during certain physical task 
performances between self-efficacy and perceived effort broke 
down at very high relative task demands (endurance exercise above 
in the heavy/severe ‘intensity’ domains).  
77 They opt to use the terms ‘tiredness’ and ‘fatigue’ to refer to 
what might be considered either acute or chronic reductions in per-
ception of capacity (self-efficacy) respectively. They note that this 
is usually task specific (as self-efficacy is normally conceptualised) 
and in most cases this is transient and behavioural adaptation will 
shift self-efficacy back in the other direction. But, in extreme cases 
Of course, actual capacity influences percep-
tion of effort (Rudner et al., 2012) which is perhaps to 
be expected if we assume that people’s perceptions of 
their capacity are related to their actual capacity. How-
ever, despite people’s perceptions of capacity being di-
rectionally associated with their actual capacity, these 
also seem to be rather coarse grained for both maximal 
capacity (Wisen et al., 2002; Bindemann et al., 2014; 
Brewer and Olsen, 2016; Gjestvang et al., 2017) and in 
predictions of remaining capacity during task perfor-
mance (at least for physical tasks; Steele et al., 2017a; 
Hackett et al., 2012; Hackett et al., 2016; Altoé Lemos 
et al., 2017; Zourdos et al., 2019; Armes et al., 2020; 
Emmanuel et al., 2020).  
 
‘Strain’, ‘Discomfort’, ‘Pain’78 
As noted earlier, at least lexically, the percep-
tion of effort should also be considered differently from 
perception of discomfort during task performance. In-
deed, where scales, and their instructions, are used for 
self-reporting perceptions of effort that do not make ex-
plicit this distinction there is the potential for individu-
als to mar their reports with the discomfort experi-
enced. Yet, in both physical tasks and cognitive tasks 
individuals are able to differentiate and separately at-
tend to the perceptions of effort and discomfort experi-
enced (Tenenbaum et al., 1999; Steele et al., 2017b; 
Fisher et al., 2017a; Fisher et al., 2017b; Hsu et al., 
2017; 2018; Stuart et al., 2018; Fisher et al., 2018; 
Bambrah et al., 2019). Indeed, with appropriate scales 
and descriptions, even the perception of effort due to 
the task of performing respiration can be differentiated 
from the unpleasant discomfort associated with percep-
tion of air hunger or breathlessness (Lansing et al., 
2000).  
 
of chronic reduction (chronic fatigue/depression) they pose this re-
duction can become more general and lead to impact on self-effi-
cacy in other tasks. 
78 I note that some may see the absence of discussion regarding 
affective valence to be of concern given the discussion of what are 
often viewed as inherently negatively valenced experiences; for 
some this includes the experience of effort, though as noted it is not 
so simple (Inzlicht et al., 2018). The absence of discussion of va-
lence here is partly because it is not clear to me what is the more 
appropriate approach to its conceptualisation. It is commonly de-
fined with respect to degrees of pleasure or displeasure (Schroeder, 
2004); but this is not the only way of conceptualising it and some 
have defined it as purely an indicator/representation of value (Car-
ruthers, 2011). Nevertheless, irrespective of the framework chosen 
for its conception, it isn’t clear whether valence falls within our in-
teroceptive phenomenology as what we experience itself; or, if in-
stead it is more a colour of how we value what we do experience 
(Serban, nd.).  
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A definition of ‘perception of’ effort 
As a result of many of these considerations, I 
have attempted to offer a definition of perception of ef-
fort that addresses the issues raised, and that is in keep-
ing with what I feel this perception is likely attempting 
to provide; that is, in essence, a conscious representa-
tion of the actual effort involved in task performance. 
My current definition of perception of effort is thus: 
 
Perception of effort; noun 
The perception of that which must be done in 
attempting to achieve a particular demand, or 
set of demands, and which is determined by the 
perception of current task demands relative to 
the perception of capacity to meet those de-
mands, though cannot exceed that current per-
ception of capacity. 
 
I believe that this definition overcomes many 
of the issues noted whereby prior definitions, and the 
tools produced from them, have often been marred by 
inappropriate descriptors. As a phenomenological var-
iable I feel it is appropriate in that it possesses:  
 
• Quality; meaning that, though it may be related 
to, it is distinct from other concepts (e.g. per-
ception of task demands, perception of capac-
ity to meet task demands, perception of dis-
comfort etc.). 
• Intensity; meaning that it has a magnitude. 
• Direction; meaning that it is ‘aimed’ at the task 
being attempted. 
• Duration; meaning that it can be experienced 
over time. 
• Hedonicity/affectivity; meaning that it can 
elicit emotions. 
• Valence; meaning that it can have either a pos-
itive or negative value ascribed to it.  
 
This definition relates to the definition offered 
for actual effort. Indeed, it could be said that it is 
merely the perceptual form of our actual effort defini-
tion i.e. the perception of task demands relative to the 
perception of capacity to meet those task demands. 
Thus, we could follow the same set theoretical ap-
proach (Markus, 2008) and define it as a construct: 
 
 
 
79 As this piece is already long enough, I’ll let you, the reader, 
imagine that for yourself and save the space on the page. 
Perception of effort (construct) 
EP(i, t, CP, DP) is the perception of effort for 
any individual i at time t where CP(i, t, xC), and 
DP(i, t, xD) are the perception of capacity and 
perception of demands respectively, and xC and 
xD are the magnitudes of those respectively for 
individual i at time t.  
 
Further, this can be extended to a conceptual 
definition – EP`(i, t, CP, DP, w) - merely by again adding 
` to denote a new variable and w to denote all possible 
states of affairs i.e. combinations of i, t, CP, and DP. Of 
course, also making this intensional to all possible 
types of tasks (e.g. tAny) and perception of capacity (and 
perception of demands) is always defined in relation to 
the nature of the task being attempted. Again, this def-
inition is, by its nature, a ratio given that perception of 
capacity and perception of demands have natural ori-
gins, and thus it could be expressed as a percentage: 
 
𝐷𝑃 ≤ 𝐶𝑃 → 𝐸𝑃 =  (
𝐷𝑃
𝐶𝑃
)  𝑥 100% 
𝐷𝑃 > 𝐶𝑃 → 𝐸𝑃 =  100% 
Equation 2. 
 
 All of the examples I offered in the section re-
garding actual effort and its definition can be extended 
here with actual merely replaced by perception of79. 
Equally, so too can figure 3. However, as noted the per-
ception of effort appears at best a coarse-grained repre-
sentation of actual effort which is probably a result of 
the introduction of ‘noise’ into the signal from both the 
sensory systems, and the perceptual system. As such, 
although the directional patterns of perception of effort 
with other variable often follow those we would expect 
based upon actual effort, they are ‘fuzzy’ and inaccu-
rate representations of reality80 (figure 5). 
Similarly, to the definition of actual effort pro-
vided, this definition of perception of effort is by no 
means unique as for both physical (Halperin and Em-
manuel, 2020) and cognitive tasks (Kirschner and 
Kirschner, 2012) there have been similar definitions 
provided. Nevertheless, I hope that this definition is 
again very clear in its derivation and assumptions, and  
80 Which could stem from inaccurate representations of actual de-
mands and actual capacity in perception leading to the inaccuracy 
in perception of effort as a representation of actual effort. 
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Figure 5. The actual effort done provides some stimulus (black line) to re-
sult in a sensory response; yet this response (A) is likely influenced by 
‘noise’. This sensory response is then appraised by the perceptual system 
where further ‘noise’ may introduce inaccuracies in representation (B). As 
a result, though patterns such as the increase in actual effort (lines) with 
time at a given fixed absolute task demand are reflected in the perception 
of effort (dots and bands), this is a coarse-grained representation (C). 
 
could be said to be ‘cleaner’. Of course, I hope its ap-
plication is useful for researchers interested in under-
standing the subjective dimension of effort in conscious 
actors. As noted, not only do clear definitions of both 
actual and perception of effort in this way permit finer 
grained control and manipulation of the variables 
within studies, but the clear conceptual differentiation 
of the two permits deeper examination of where, when, 
and why discordance exists between them. Before con-
cluding, I offer some brief thoughts on the measure-
ment of the subjective dimension of effort and applica-
tion of this definition. 
 
 
81 There is a beautiful irony in this: because answering regarding 
the perception of effort is difficult (the meta-cognitive process of 
relating perception of demands and perception of capacity is likely 
inherently ‘costly’ itself), a more accessible and easier question is 
answered in order to reduce the effort. 
82 Winchester et al. (2012) found that men performing the same 
absolute demand treadmill task (20 minutes at 60% of their peak 
treadmill speed) reported higher ratings of perception of effort when 
observed by a male, and lower when observed by a female, com-
pared to a control condition. Considering the task performed meant 
that the actual effort required was the same every time it seems that 
either the observer did genuinely influence participant’s percep-
tions of effort such that they no longer were accurate reflections of 
the actual effort required, or that participants were dishonest in their 
reporting for psychosocial reasons relating to the observer. 
83 In this respect it is worth noting that, though it has been said 
that “Psychophysical measures are inherently subjective and there-
fore are suspected to lack validity...” (Hutchinson and Tenenbaum, 
Further thoughts on measuring perception of effort 
As noted, a critical lens must be applied to any 
first-person data (Dennett, 1991; 2003; Velmans, 2006; 
Piccinini, 2010). Definitions are of particular im-
portance when generating self-reports given that, ab-
sent the provision of a clear definition from the re-
searcher, people often apply their own idioscyncratic 
definitions (Dunning et al., 1989; Dunning and McEl-
wee, 1995). Further, with respect to perception of ef-
fort, as highlighted people can often conflate other sa-
lient perceptions in their self-reported ratings. In addi-
tion, despite the effort of task performances being in-
dependent of their success/failure (Massin, 2017), peo-
ple often apply substitution heuristics81 whereby they 
answer regarding their perception of how well they per-
form (Picou et al., 2017; Moore and Picou, 2018). The 
observer’s sex may also impact upon ratings of percep-
tion of effort (Winchester et al., 2012)82. Indeed, it is 
unknown if the mere act of asking someone to provide 
rating of their phenomenology actually changes the ex-
perienced phenomenology (Ariely, 1998); thereby in-
validating the self-report for its presumably intended 
purpose before it is even made. Researchers should 
probably consider whether capturing measurements of 
the perception of effort are in the interest of understand-
ing effort phenomenology specifically, or in gaining a 
measurement that is a ‘proxy’ indicator of the actual 
effort required83. Evidently, it is impossible for us to 
ever know the phenomenology of anyone other than 
ourselves. But there are likely things that can be done 
to ‘calibrate’ our self-reporting instruments (partici-
pants) as best as possible such that they provide the best 
measurements of the phenomena we are interested (Pic-
cinini, 2010). 
2019); indeed, I have previously thought that they can really only 
be known to lack validity if the intention is to measure something 
other than the subjective experience; there is arguably no guarantee 
either that the ‘rating’ we obtain is in fact a valid reflection of the 
phenomenology it is intended to represent. In all regards, caution in 
interpretation is encouraged when it comes to phenomenology. That 
being said, practically, and from the considering of the two ‘con-
struct’ definitions I have provided, it is possible, given that they are 
both ratios for perfect collinearity along the identity with the same 
mean and standard deviation. If this were the case empirically in a 
given population then we would be able to say that both actual and 
perception of effort has strong identity. The more coarsely grained 
collinearity between the two constructs however that has been ob-
served empirically, at least up until now, could be said to reflect 
weak identity (Markus, 2008). As long as researchers are openly 
aware of this limit, I have no real issue with using perceptual reports 
as coarse proxies for actual effort.   
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Considering the definition provided, I would 
argue that appropriate instruction and anchoring is re-
quired as some minimum for accurate measurement of 
perception of effort. Hopefully it has been made clear 
that, without instruction, persons typically anchor their 
perception of effort upon their other salient perceptions 
substituting or mixing the ratings provided. An appro-
priate definition of maximal effort in relation to the ab-
solute task demands is likely needed and I would con-
tend that anchoring should be performed in relation to 
the task demands using either descriptive explanation, 
past experience and memory84, experiential procedures, 
or all of these. If the task is to maintain a particular ab-
solute demand for an extended period of time for ex-
ample this might require some explanation of the no-
tion of ‘task failure’ (i.e. the point at which despite at-
tempting to do so you can no longer maintain the task 
demands) again specifying what those demands are.  
If it is of interest to also examine other percep-
tions (i.e. ‘heaviness’, ‘fatigue’, ‘discomfort’) then 
these should be appropriately differentiated from per-
ceived effort and full details provided of their applica-
tion. However, if applying several scales consideration 
should be made for issues of scale burden and how this 
may impact ratings given by participants. I would en-
courage instead replication of individual perception of 
effort response effects with certain experimental condi-
tions before then applying that experimental paradigm 
to examine new perceptual measures as dependent var-
iables. That way you can have at least some confidence 
of the stability of the perception of effort under those 
experimental conditions and then examine other per-
ceptions in relation to them. 
In some cases, researchers may be interested in 
capturing measures of first-person perceptions of third-
persons. For example, it may be of interest to under-
stand how well not only our own perceptions of effort 
are reflective of the actual effort required for tasks, but 
also our perceptions of others (Steele et al., 2017b; Ib-
botson et al., 2019)85. Another interest might be in the 
prediction86, anticipation, or remembering of task per-
formances and their phenomenology (Höst and Wohlin, 
1997; Hsu et al., 2018; Dunn et al., 2017; Bambrah et 
al., 2019). 
 
84 An example might be asking participants to imagine the most 
demanding version of the specific task they think they would be 
capable of doing and then to consider how demanding it is to com-
plete the task in relation to that. 
85 Relatedly, research has examined people’s perceptions of oth-
ers capacities (i.e. team self-efficacy; Feltz et al., 1989; Parker, 
1992) and people’s perceptions of the capacity of robots compared 
to their actual capacity (Cha et al, 2015). 
Lastly, irrespective of exactly how perceptions 
are captured by researchers I would strongly encourage 
fully reporting the scale used and the administration 
procedures, including anchoring, instructions to partic-
ipants, and the timings and environments when ratings 
were captured, so that readers can fully understand ex-
actly what was measured and how. Independently of 
the considerations discussed in this paper, open and 
transparent reporting would likely result in far clearer 
interpretations of research going forwards, be a big step 
towards improving our understanding of these areas, 
and may aid in the development of better psychophysi-
cal scales for the measurement of perception of effort 
across task modalities. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
Considering the historic and recently renewed 
growth in interest regarding ‘effort’, the purpose of this 
manuscript was to consider and define ‘effort’ during 
task performance; hopefully, in a successful attempt to 
bring clarity to the topic, and permit unification of the 
variable across different fields of inquiry. In doing so I 
have argued for a distinction between the actual effort 
required, and the perception of that effort, during inten-
tional performance of tasks. Further, I have followed a 
set theoretical approach to defining both actual effort 
and perception of effort as both constructs and con-
cepts. Lastly, I have offered what small advice I can to 
aid researchers in applying these definitions and in par-
ticular in measurement of perception of effort. Hope-
fully, one personal goal has also been achieved in pro-
ducing this manuscript: I have made my own current 
conceptualisation and understanding of effort clear to 
myself, and to other researchers. At the very least, my 
own subsequent empirical work on the topic can be 
considered in light of it. 
In terms of future research regarding actual ef-
fort and perception of effort, the definitions and con-
siderations for measurement presented might better en-
able an understanding to be developed of where percep-
tions are, or are not, accurate reflections of reality, the 
reasons for this87 and the implications of this. Further, 
researchers might explicitly look to understand both the 
independent and combined impacts of both objective 
86 Or even the impact that predictions of effort may have upon the 
perception of effort when actually experienced.  
87 For example, is it because the perception of task demands, or 
the perception of capacity, are inaccurate reflections of reality? 
When, where, and why do errors influence the representation of ef-
fort in perception? 
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and subjective dimensions of effort in: selection and in-
itiation of behaviour (i.e. task attempts); behavioural 
persistence in task performance and task attempt cessa-
tion88; the underlying mechanisms involved in carrying 
out task performances; how people adapt to the contin-
ued performance of task behaviours etc. 
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